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I. OVERVIEW
A. Introduction
Conversations about compulsory financial contributions to labor
unions' and related abuses of union expenditures2 occupy a contestable
space. Despite suffering from chronic obscurity, the debate has been
electrifying.' Dues objectors contend that compelled membership
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1. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), "as interpreted and
applied by the courts and the National Labor Relations Board . . . does not require that
employees become full union members subject to union rules and discipline. Rather...
employees can only be required to pay dues and initiation fees as a condition of
employment." Ronald Turner, "Membership" Obligations Under NLRA Section 8(a)(3): A
Proposal for Statutory Change, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 323, 325 (2000) (referencing
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994)). Similar rules apply to public employees covered by state
law. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (opining the U.S.
Supreme Court found that the Constitution does not prevent an agency shop agreement
between a public employer and an employees' union that requires every employee in the
unit to pay a service fee to defray the costs of representation).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT P. HUNTER, PAUL S. KERSEY & SHAWN P. MILLER, THE MICHIGAN
UNION ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: A STEP TOWARD ACCOUNTABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN
LABOR ORGANIZATION 10-13 (2001), available at The Mackinac Center for Public Policy,
140 West Main Street P.O. Box 568 Midland, Michigan 48640 (providing an example of
union leaders embezzling union dues).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Friesen, The Costs of "Fee Speech "-Restrictions on the Use of
Union Dues to Fund New Organizing, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 603, 606 (1988) (providing
a brief history of an argument against restricting the use of union dues); Roger C. Hartley,
Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1989) ("Dues objector litigation has been raging quietly in Railway
Labor Act and public sector collective bargaining contexts for over thirty years."); Harry G.
Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest: Infusing the Labor Union Dues Dispute with First
Amendment Values, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1309 (2006) [hereinafter Hutchison, A
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constitutes a cover for forcing ideological conformity4 and allege that both
membership and financial contributions impermissibly interfere "with their
freedom of thought, conscience and association protected by the Bill of
Rights to the Federal Constitution."' Objectors typically challenge
political, ideological, organizing and lobbying expenditures, and dispute
union compliance with constitutional principles governing the collection
and the rebate of fees.6  Such objections traverse the ostensible barrier
between private and state action as well as the boundary cabined by the
Railway Labor Act (RLA), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and
state statutes governing public employee bargaining
The Supreme Court's recent decision, upholding a Washington state
initiative that imposed paycheck protection restrictions on labor unions,' is
sure to rekindle this conversation. This debate will likely extend beyond
pure legal analysis and the implications of the Court's often repeated
admonition that a union "could not, consistently with the Constitution,
collect from dissenting employees any sums for the support of ideological
causes not germane to its duties as collective-bargaining agent." 9 This
conversation will also transcend the perimeters of the employer-employee
relationship and encroach on the boundary established by conflicting
Clearing in the Forest] (analyzing the union dues dispute from a free speech viewpoint);
Harry G. Hutchison, Diversity, Tolerance and Human Rights: The Future of Labor Unions
and the Union Dues Dispute, 49 WAYNE L. REV. 705 (2003) [hereinafter Hutchison,
Diversity, Tolerance and Human Rights] (analyzing the union dues dispute from a human
rights perspective); Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union
Dues? A Postmodern Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 447 (2000) [hereinafter Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through
Union Dues] (arguing that union dues subvert the interests of individuals in support of
hierarchical claims); Heidi Marie Wemtz, Waiver of Beck Rights and Resignation Rights:
Infusing the Union-Member Relationship with Individualized Commitment, 43 CATH. U. L.
REV. 159 (1993) (analyzing the effect of dues checkoffs on union members).
4. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 515 (1991) (citing Ry. Employes'
Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956)).
5. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 916 (2d ed. 2004).
6. Id. at 916-35.
7. Id. at 916-27.
8. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2007) (upholding § 760, a state
restriction, as applied to public-sector unions that restricts a union's authority to coerce
financial payments for political purposes).
9. Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984). See also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at
521 (holding that neither labor peace, nor the goal of avoiding free-riding, is served by
charging objecting public employees for lobbying, electoral and other political activities that
do not relate to their collective-bargaining agreement); Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson,
475 U.S. 292, 293 (1986) (applying Ellis to public-sector union dues disputes). But see
Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739-43 (1988) (upholding the dissenters'
challenge to compulsory dues on duty of fair representation grounds but declining to reach
the dissenters' First Amendment claim).
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interpretations of human autonomy, solidarity, the First Amendment and
election campaign finance laws. Debates can either illuminate or produce
confusion. Ultimately this debate addresses the proper role of labor unions
in a representative democracy." Sorting through this dispute is made more
difficult because Americans live in a society, if not a world, that appears to
be falling apart." Accordingly, squabbles about human autonomy, the
necessity of group cooperation, the role of unions and the scope of
constitutional mandates are apt to become hazy no matter how much
revelation becomes available.
One commentator asserts that the Davenport decision, requiring the
teachers' unions to get nonmembers' permission before expending their
dues for political purposes, represents a setback for organized labor. 2
Another observer heralds the decision as a vindication of First Amendment
rights of nonunion members to be free from compulsory payments for a
union's political speech. 3 By contrast, Bob Chanin, general counsel for the
National Education Association (NEA), America's largest teacher's union,
downplays the ruling as having no practical effect on labor unions.1
4
Bradley Smith, former chairman of the Federal Election Commission
(FEC), offers the most nuanced response.' 5 He contends that paycheck
protection laws rarely live up to the hype because such laws are generally
written under the auspices of campaign finance, and therefore only affect a
tiny sliver of union political expenditures: express advocacy.16 Moreover,
state campaign finance laws do not apply to federal election activity.17
Hence, the impact of state paycheck protection initiatives, like the one at
issue before the Davenport Court, appears to be negligible.'" The
irrelevancy of such initiatives multiplies due to the information asymmetry
between objectors and union officials. The latter 19 can easily evade the
10. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union Dues, supra note 3, at
448-49 (discussing two possible conceptions of labor unions).
11. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Spirituality, Fundamentalism, Liberty: Religion at the
End of Modernity, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1197 (2005).
12. David G. Savage, Justices Curb Unions' Use of Fees for Politics, L.A. TIMES, June
15, 2007, at A20.
13. Brad Shannon, High Court Rejects 'Opt Out,' OLYMPIAN, June 14, 2007, at lB
(quoting Washington State Attorney General Rob McKenna).
14. Amy Fagan, States Can Put Rules on Use of Union Fees, WASH. TIMES, June 15,
2007, at AOl (quoting Bob Chanin).
15. Bradley A. Smith, A Free-Speech Salve; End Compulsory Unionism, WASH. TIMES,
June 29, 2007, at A19 (arguing against government regulation of political speech).
16. Id.
17. Id. Federal campaign-finance debates may be affected by the Supreme Court's
decision upholding a challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act ("BCRA") of 2002.
Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., No. 06-969, slip op. at 3 (June 25, 2007)
(permitting certain issue ads to be aired during BCRA blackout periods).
18. Smith, supra note 15.
19. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1395-98.
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intent of these laws by slightly modifying the nature of their political
expenditures.2 ° In fact, creative accounting evidently allowed labor unions
to collect and spend substantially more money on politics (broadly defined)
the year after the Washington state law went into effect.2' In consideration
of the above, the capability of union dues restrictions to protect the
preferences and the interests of working people from the threat of
ideological conformity remains in doubt. My thesis is that the Supreme
Court's holding in the Davenport case cannot fully vindicate human
autonomy or individual liberty despite the claims and counter-claims of a
number of observers. Correctly understood, this decision promises little
and delivers even less because it fails to deal decisively and
comprehensively with the issues that both earlier private sector22 and public
sector23 union dues disputes illuminated but failed to settle. Tied to the
earlier precedent, the Davenport case falls short of recapturing fully the
First Amendment values of expression and association.
B. Background
Leo Troy foreshadows the Davenport case and similar union dues
litigation. We live, he argues, in an epoch that has experienced the decline
in the "old unionism" and the rise in the "new unionism. 2 4  This
development signifies the collapse of private-sector unions and the rise of
public sector unions.25  The ascent of the "new unionism" signals the
growing dominance of the labor movement by white-collar organizations
including teachers' unions.26 Public sector unions appear to be committed
to what can be described as an anti-market ideology. 27 Anti-market
ideology conduces toward pseudo-scientific and bureaucratic
20. Mark Mix, Supreme Court's Davenport Case Could Create Union Dues Rebate,
EXAMINER, Dec. 15, 2006, http://www.examiner.com/printa-457701~Mark Mix:_Supreme_
Court'sDavenport-case-could createunionduesrebate.html; see also Hutchison, A
Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1395-1400 (emphasizing accounting and other
issues, which impair union dues objectors' ability to fully vindicate their rights).
21. Smith, supra note 15.
22. See, e.g., Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (discussing
whether the collection of nonmembers' fees for purposes unrelated to collective bargaining
violated the union's duty of fair representation); see also infra Part III.B-C. (discussing the
legal precedent concerning first amendment rights in union dues adjudication).
23. See, e.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991) (discussing the
limitations upon the payment of dues by a nonmember to a union in the public sector
required as a condition of employment); see also infra Part III.B-C.
24. Richard W. Hurd, Industrial Relations Theory, 58 INDuS. & LAB. REL. REv. 305,
305 (2005) (reviewing LEO TROY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE OLD UNIONISM (2004)).
25. Id. (citing TROY, supra note 24).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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managerialism, which is reflected in government efforts to manipulate the
economy." This maneuver is legitimized by speculation that the
government possesses resources that rank and file workers and citizens
lack.29 Unions' anti-market attitude, justified presumably by the prospect
of market failure, ignores the even greater likelihood of government failure.
Anti-market/pro-bureaucracy ideology seems firmly attached to the fatal
tendency of mankind to promote group welfare at others' expense by
deploying the government to seize the earnings of others.30 It is far from
clear that all workers have capitulated to this ideology no matter how
frequently union leaders suggest otherwise. Wielding substantial economic
wealth,3' unions continue to exert considerable political influence.3 2 It is
possible that the political influence of public and private sector unions
assures their long-term survival and the survival of the labor movement.33
Consistent with this thesis, Leo Troy identifies the Democratic Party as
America's labor party through which unions have traditionally lobbied for
their interests.34
As I have intimated elsewhere,35 Americans occupy a society that is
waiting, but does not know what it is waiting for.36 Dreaming of
liberation,37 individuals populate a variety of interest groups. American
28. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 85 (2d ed.
1984). MacIntyre suggests that as the government becomes more scientific and accepts that
it can manipulate human action, it "becomes a hierarchy of bureaucratic managers .... " Id.
According to MacIntyre, "the major justification advanced for the intervention of
government in society is the contention that government has resources of competence which
most citizens do not possess." Id.
29. Id.
30. FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 9-10 (Dean Russell trans., 1990).
31. Hurd, supra note 24, at 305 (citing TROY, supra note 24); see also LINDA CHAVEZ &
DANIEL GRAY, BETRAYAL 12 (2004) (suggesting that labor union revenues approach or
exceed upwards of $17 billion a year).
32. See CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 12 (arguing that unions have so much
money at their disposal that they can spend more on politics than do both major political
parties combined); see also William J. Moore et al., The Political Influence of Unions and
Corporations on COPE Votes in the US. Senate, 1979-1988, 16 J. LAB. RES. 203, 218-19
(1995) (concluding that the evidence fails to show a decline in the political influence of
unions).
33. Hurd, supra note 24, at 305 (citing TROY, supra note 24).
34. Id.; see also CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 52-55 (explaining that John
Sweeney, President of the AFL-CIO, led an effort by labor movement advocates to pour
hundreds of millions of dollars in a campaign to support the Democratic Party's policies);
TAYLOR E. DARK, THE UNIONS AND THE DEMOCRATS: AN ENDURING ALLIANCE (1999)
(describing the strong relationship between the Democratic party and labor unions).
35. See generally Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1311-14
(discussing the reasons behind Americans' declining interest in joining unions).
36. CHANTAL DELSOL, ICARUS FALLEN: THE SEARCH FOR MEANING IN AN UNCERTAIN
WORLD xxvii (2003).
37. Id.
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individualism may reflect the cultural climax of fourteenth and fifteenth
century developments that emphasized a tradition of individual rights and
liberties.38 In our contemporary society, citizens may surmise that choice
enables them to find meaning in a life that confronts never-ending
possibilities.39 In view of these humanistic attitudes, any evaluation of
union dues and their appropriation in the political sphere raises questions
about the nature of autonomy, individual as opposed to group motivation,
and uncertainty about the goals that unions, like other groups, ought to
pursue.4° This development has become part of a microcosm that mimics
the clash of civilizations and cultures in the wider world.4 Self-interest,
preferences, the boundaries of consent, and the benefits and costs of
collective action are arrayed against the possibility that a broad definition
of unions' societal function requires limiting individual rights and
choices.42  Such issues fuse politics, economics and First Amendment
norms.43 These issues become ever more poignant as the labor movement
struggles to stem decades of decline and combat the emerging fissures
within the union hierarchy itself.
44
Labor unions arose in part out of a moving critique of industrial
capitalism and represent "the attempt to have the democracy of Paris
without the slavery of Rome. 45  The labor movement may reflect the
"determination to assert the superiority of moral principles over economic
appetites, which have their place.., in the human scheme, but which, like
other natural appetites, when flattened and pampered and overfed, bring
ruin to the soul and confusion to society. 46  However moving labor's
critique of the market may be, differences of opinion surface over the
capability of labor unions to proffer moral principles sufficient to
accomplishing the task of justifying their proposed solutions to society's
ills.
Operationally, labor unions might function in either of two ways: (1)
as a form of majoritarian hegemony that operates as statutorily privileged
38. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER 71 (1996).
39. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1311.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, Supra note 38, at 56-121.
42. George Feldman, Unions, Solidarity, and Class: The Limits of Liberal Labor Law,
15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 187, 193 (1994).
43. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1311.
44. Thomas B. Edsall, Two Top Unions Split from AFL-CIO, WASH. POST, July 26,
2005, at Al (noting the decline in the labor movement coupled with the resignation of two
of the nation's largest unions from the AFL-CIO).
45. Richard Gill, Oikos and Logos: Chesterton's Vision of Distributism, 10 LOGOS 64,
65 (2007) (quoting Chesterton's interpretation of the labor problem).
46. Id. at 66-67 (quoting Richard Tawney in his analysis of moral values over economic
growth).
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"mini-legislatures '47 or, alternatively, (2) as a group "to which the
individual has given uncoerced express or tacit consent., 48  Without
individual assent, it is improbable that the group performs consistently with
customary explanations of the First Amendment's freedom of association
and free speech discourse.49 Since "any form of affiliation or association
can impinge [on] ... individual sovereignty," human association may be
viewed as "essentially artificial, instrumental and temporary in character"50
and an invasion of one's liberty.5 By one account, human autonomy can
be attached securely to the substance and structures of constitutional
democracy.52
Freedom of thought, conscience, speech, and association all appear to
be attached to some conception of autonomy. 3 The notion of autonomy is
diminished, however, by its own set of difficulties. Autonomy can be
stated in putatively neutral terms, but lurking behind allegiance to the idea
of autonomy are faith commitments that not everyone shares.5 4  It is
doubtful that radical human autonomy has been fully purchased by all
workers and all Americans. Still, Americans possess diverse viewpoints on
a wide range of issues which may animate their desire for First Amendment
protection, including the protection of speech and association. Conversely,
Stanley Fish vitiates such sentiments by arguing that for modern liberal
societies like the United States, "there is no such thing as free speech,"
which he suggests is a good thing.5 This contradicts what has come to be
47. See Molly S. McUsic & Michael Selmi, Post Modern Unions: Identity Politics in
the Workplace, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1339, 1343 (1997) (suggesting that collective bargaining
was conceived as a form of democratic self-government complete with general legislative
principles including majority rule).
48. But see Thomas C. Kohler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions,
Associations, Our First Amendment Discourse and the Problem of Debartolo, 1990 Wis. L.
REV. 149, 183 (1990) (explaining that only those groups to which individuals consent have
legitimate power).
49. Id. at 182-86 (arguing that the language that informs our first amendment discourse
has taught us to regard freedom in individualistic terms).
50. Id. at 184 (explaining that associations are artificial, temporary and instrumental
structures as they invade individual autonomy).
51. Id. (suggesting that entering into associations entails the surrender of some ability to
freely make decisions).
52. See Youngjae Lee, Valuing Autonomy, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2973, 2973-74 (2007)
(discussing, through a review of James Fleming's book Securing Constitutional Democracy,
the importance tied to both autonomy and freedom to make choices about self-governance,
such as entering into associations).
53. Id. at 2974 (explaining that the right to make choices individually and as part of a
group is part of one concept of liberty).
54. See Hutchison, Diversity, Tolerance and Human Rights, supra note 3, at 752
(suggesting that autonomy is not a neutral term).
55. See LARRY ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? 178 (2005)
(quoting STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH, AND IT'S A GOOD THING,
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seen as the classically liberal view; but perhaps some commentators and a
few union hierarchs might agree with Professor Fish's intuition. Prowling
in the background of most American debates are conflicting conceptions of
liberalism. It is unlikely that labor union members and labor leaders have
been able to resolve their conflicting views of liberalism on terms that all
will agree are just.
Recent evidence confirms that private sector union membership is
collapsing,56 while public sector membership either stagnates or, more
likely, declines. 7  Though individual autonomy and liberty exist as
contestable notions," it is plausible that atomistic autonomy and the
principled commitment to liberty embodied in classically liberal notions of
freedom of expression and association constitute a challenge to both private
and public sector union growth as well as dominant conceptions of
workers' collective interest. Resistance can take two forms: (1) a refusal
to join unions, which fuels the ongoing decline in overall membership or
(2) a refusal to pay dues by nonmembers who are represented by unions.
Consistent with that paradigm, when Washington state public sector
workers were given a choice of whether to support a labor union's political
and ideological mission, nearly 85% refused to allow their dues go to
politics.59 This case provides an additional example of the ongoing conflict
between individual and group interests and between individual and group
preferences.
This Article represents an extension of my prior work that has
considered the union dues controversy. Since unions appear to be the locus
of a postmodern conflict, Part II provides an analysis animated by public
choice, postmodernism and First Amendment norms that underscore the
complexity of the issues at stake. Part III offers an examination of
Too (1994) to argue that freedom of speech in part exists due to exercise of constraints on
freedom of speech and other qualities that violate liberal understandings of it).
56. See, e.g., Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and
Coverage Database from the CPS, http://www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/unionstats/contents.htm
(last visited Feb. 28, 2008) (showing that private sector membership fell from 24.2% in
1973 to 7.4% in 2006).
57. Id. (showing that public sector membership fell from 38.7% in 1994 to 36.2% in
2006 while the percentage of covered workers fell from 44.7% to 40.1% during the same
period).
58. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (suggesting that "matters involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."). But see J. BUDZISZEWSKI, WHAT
WE CAN'T NOT KNow 6-7 (2003) (offering a cautionary clarification of human autonomy).
59. See CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 46 (illustrating that individuals belonging to
labor unions in the public sector do not want their labor unions to enter into the political
arena; rather, they prefer to make politically-related choices individually while allowing
unions to make ideologically-based choices).
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Supreme Court precedent, explores the ostensible distinction between
private- and public-sector cases and inspects the validity of the Court's
free-rider jurisprudence. The cases imply that First Amendment values
appear to be highly contingent and court interpretations highly flexible.
Part IV provides an examination of the Davenport case aimed at
discovering Court deference, if any, to First Amendment rights and values.
In Part V, I provide arguments, recommendations and speculations aimed
at reclaiming human autonomy, individual liberty and a principled
understanding of First Amendment ideals. Ultimately, however, I suggest
the implausibility of recapturing a principled understanding of the First
Amendment in a society torn apart by simmering disagreement. While the
Supreme Court rightly enforced Washington State's dues restrictions, it is
unlikely that paycheck protection legislation or referenda can rescue First
Amendment rights and values from adjudication that transforms principle
into a wobbly platform.
II. LABOR UNIONS AS THE LOCUS OF POSTMODERN CONFLICTS?
As a result of their political influence, revenues, and ideological
commitments, labor unions have become the focal point of many
contestable issues. Labor unions and labor federations, led by hierarchs,
have taken sides in a variety of debates regarding contested policies. It is
unlikely that all such decisions can be seen to epitomize collective
rationality in some meaningful sense, particularly in the absence of worker
preference uniformity. In view of the fact that labor unions and labor
advocates increasingly see unions and the labor movement as a fighting
force for class-based justice 6° and societal transformation, it is possible that
virtually all union expenditures (including collective-bargaining expenses)
have freedom of expression implications that are adverse to the interests of
dissenters.
To repeat a forecast that has now become a reality, the labor
movement faces a period of serious retrenchment. Private-sector union
density rates have fallen from 24.2% in 1973 to 7.4% in 2006.61 During the
same period, public-sector rates rose from 23% to 36.2%.62 Today, even
public-sector rates are not immune from decline, falling from 38.7% in
1994 to 36.2% in 2006.63 In addition, public-sector workers covered by
60. See id. at 52 (quoting Dennis Rivera, a New York City labor leader who supports a
socialist agenda that includes class consciousness, social upheaval and the political
rejuvenation of labor).
61. Hirsch & Macpherson, supra note 56 (providing private-sector membership data).
62. Id.
63. Id.
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union contracts fell from 44.7% in 1994 to 40.1% during the same period.
6'
Overall union density (combined public and private sector rates) reflects
this downward trend falling from 15.5% in 199465 to approximately 12.5%
in 2005.66
The fall in union density rates appears to signify "that collective
bargaining has become an anachronistic means of promoting employee
interests" and may lead to the "loss of legitimacy for unions as the enablers
of group action., 67  This phenomenon may confirm James Madison's
suggestion that the diversity in the faculties of men is an obstacle to finding
an enduring basis for uniformity of interest.
68 Given the degeneration in
union power and influence in the workplace, a variety of proposals for pro-
labor union action have arisen,6 9 including the redeployment of union dues
as a vehicle for reclaiming the labor movement.
7 ° If union leaders see
union dues principally as a vehicle for societal transformation, it would be
remarkable if they did not attempt to compel labor solidarity through
opposition to paycheck protection referenda, and legislation and
adjudications that vindicate the claims of dissenters. At the same time,
some hierarchs and labor advocates are drawn toward renewed efforts to
revitalize collectivization7 1 through politics and an emphasis on labor
organizing funded by dues contributions.
72 These moves may be related
and may pit workers' individuality against the supremacy of collective
action, including efforts deemed necessary to achieve workplace
64. Id. (providing public-sector membership data).
65. Terry Thomason & John F. Burton, Unionization Trends and Labor-Management
Cooperation in the Public Sector, in GOING PUBLIC: THE ROLE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS IN DELIVERING QUALITY GOVERNMENT SERVICES 69, 72 (Jonathan Brock &
David B. Lipsky eds., 2003) (illustrating employment, union membership and union
density).
66. Press Release, Alliance for Worker Freedom, Union Membership Plummets Across
All Sectors of Workforce (Jan. 25, 2007), www.atr.org/content/pdf/2007/jan/012507awfpr-
density.pdf (citing Bureau of Labor statistics).
67. James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74
TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (1996).
68. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
69. See generally Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union Dues,
supra note 3, at 455-56 (examining proposals for the enlargement of workplace democracy,
increased access to the property of unorganized firms, the democratization of firms through
a systematic program of egalitarian market reconstruction [government regulation], and
boosting the minimum wage).
70. Id.
71. Ellen Dannin, NLRA Values, Labor Values, American Values, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP.
& LAB. L. 223, 274 (2005) (supporting collective values).
72. See, e.g., Friesen, supra note 3, at 603-04 (supporting the use of dues for organizing
purposes).
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democracy,73 boosting the minimum wage or other labor reform agenda
proposals.
None of these efforts are surprising. After all, labor unions, like other
interest groups, come into being to further the interest of their members.74
But once the large initial costs of organization are overcome, unions tend to
engage in other activities of interest to their members, or leadership, such
as lobbying for legislation.75
Invoking echoes of the past, contemporary labor advocates appear
intent upon spurring social improvement through greater government
76control 'of the economy. Not satisfied solely with government
intervention in the economy, labor unions have taken positions on a
number of issues unrelated to bargaining. Evidence can be adduced
showing that unions have enlisted compulsory dues payments in support of
drug legalization, campaigns to promote abortion, and efforts to compel the
Boy Scouts to accept atheists and homosexuals.77 Although it is possible
that the hierarchs possess insights and superior knowledge that workers
lack, it would be remarkable if all rank and file workers agreed to disregard
their own views on such topics to support the views of hierarchs. Whatever
opinion workers may have regarding these controversies, it is difficult to
imagine that labor union support for these causes improves workers' pay,
benefits, or working conditions.7 8 It seems clear that unions are no longer
captivated by such narrow issues as workers' pay and benefits but instead
see themselves as a robust engine of collective insurgency that transcends
the boundaries of craft, geography, the national-state and narrowly
prescribed self-interests.79 This move encourages unions and union leaders
to take controversial stances on a wide-range of issues that remain outside
the frontier of workers' economic interest.
For several "decades after the founding of the labor movement, union
leaders had eschewed politics because they recognized that their members
did not all share the same political beliefs."8° Today, mounting viewpoint
diversity among citizens and workers appears to be contradicted by the
apparent willingness of union leaders to throw their members' interests to
the wind in order to advance their own political beliefs.81 It is possible that
73. Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda for
Legal Reform, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 3-7 (1988).
74. DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II 308 (rev. ed. 1989).
75. Id.
76. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 16.
77. Id. at 18.
78. Id.
79. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union Dues, supra note 3, at
448-50.
80. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 18-19.
81. Id. at 19.
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these differences of opinion on controversial topics within the membership
pivoted against labor hierarchs who use union dues to lobby for non-work
related issues. These differences spur union fragmentation and undermine
group solidarity. It is equally possible that some union leaders appear to
have adopted an ossified conception of tolerance that instructs rank and file
members to subordinate their own views and consciences to the superiority
of the collective conscience. As part of this move, union hierarchs paper
over deeply antagonistic world-views that mirror Alasdair MacIntyre's
observation that there is an interminable and unsettleable character of much
of what passes for American's contemporary moral and philosophical
debates. 82 The ever-increasing scope of these debates and the profound
depth of cultural division combine to reflect a clash of orthodoxies on a
number of levels.
83
Against-such maneuvers, postmodem norms and discourse add weight
and poignancy to the allegation that workers' conflicting preferences and
interests have been impermissibly suppressed. In the past, workers were
seen to be bound together by their common interests, and whatever
conflicts existed among workers paled in importance to the larger struggle
against management.' 4 Today, the focal point of struggle has plausibly
shifted to the diverse interests of workers.85 Consistent with this move,
Professor Gedicks offers an invigorating hypothesis: instead of living in a
society characterized by a uniformity of views, we live in a world that has
fallen apart.8 6 We have been described variously as living at the end of an
age, stalking the twilight of being, and muddling through the aftermath of
confusion and helplessness in a world that lacks reality.
8 7  This
metaphysical implosion8 8 has a bearing on all of life, including the lives
and the political aspirations of American workers, particularly when
arrayed against contrasting hegemonic possibilities offered by union
leaders. Whether Professor Gedicks is correct or incorrect, the dispute
about the meaning, propriety and justification of labor union dues extracted
for political purposes implies the difficulty of resolution on terms that all
will concede as fair.
Coherent with this intuition, Professor Maclntyre contends:
82. MACINTYRE, supra note 28, at 226.
83. See generally ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION,
AND MORALITY IN CRISIS (2001); Harry G. Hutchison, Shaming Kindergarteners?
Channeling Dred Scott? Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools, 56 CATH. U. L.
REv. 361, 361-68 (2007) [hereinafter Hutchison, Freedom of Expression Rights in Public
Schools].
84. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 47, at 1339.
85. Id.
86. Gedicks, supra note 11, at 1197.
87. Id. at 1197-98.
88. Id. at 1197.
UNION DUES RESTRICTIONS
It is not just that we live too much by a variety and multiplicity of
fragmented concepts; it is that these are used at one and the same
time to express rival and incompatible social ideals and policies
and to furnish us with a pluralist political rhetoric whose function
is to conceal the depth of our conflicts.89
Explicating the incompatibility of Rawls and Nozick, Alasdair MacIntyre
shows that it is probable that society can only move toward a shared
understanding of justice within the context of a tradition and a community
whose primary bond is a shared understanding of the good for man and for
community where individuals identify their primary interest with reference
to those goods.90 If MacIntyre's observations are true, postmodernism
implicates contradictory understandings of justice, which verify that
America and American workers face insoluble issues. Nor is government
likely to be helpful in resolving these disputes. Government no longer
represents a shared moral community of citizens but a set of institutional
arrangements for imposing bureaucratized unity on a society that lacks a
consensus.91
While collective agreement and cooperation may remain a faint
possibility, labor unions must still confront the irresolvable character of
debates over the morality of many political and social issues, including the
basis for utilizing union dues for political and ideological purposes. For
some commentators, union dues advance social and workplace "justice."
For others, justice is impossible in the face of compelled expenditures that
facilitate political and ideological goals. Such disputes, fastened as they
are to alternative and incommensurable notions of justice, may not be
settled short of authoritarianism or oblivion despite society's frequent
resort to the language of pluralism, democracy and equality. This
vocabulary serves to mask the depth and extent of Americans'
disagreement and confirms Karl Marx's observation that "conflict and not
consensus is at the heart of modern social structure." 92
Disputes fester about what labor groups can legitimately demand of
represented workers. Indeed, disagreement, not unanimity, may be the null
hypothesis. 93 Disagreements intensify because survey evidence focusing
on private-sector workers implies that it is improbable that all or even a
majority of workers share the conviction that conventional unions are the
best vehicles for the advancement of the full gamut of their interests.94 If
89. MACINTYRE, supra note 28, at 253.
90. Id. at 250.
91. Id. at 254.
92. See, e.g., id. at 253 (illustrating the prevalence of conflict in the modem social
structure).
93. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1313.
94. Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Reform, 12
LAB. LAW 117, 118 n.2 (1996).
2008]
676 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
this data can be extrapolated to the entire workforce, it implies that the
majority of unionized workers may be required to acquiesce to union
mandates, even when they believe union hierarchs are deeply wrong. This
conclusion is consistent with the recognition of public choice theory that
individual interest has always been distinct from group interest.
95 Coherent
with this. recognition, the salaries of union hierarchs continue to spiral
upward while the number of union members and the pay and benefits for
represented workers fall.96  Compulsory unions operating as a coercive
grouping of people are likely to experience results that differ substantially
from voluntary groups. Compulsion in contemporary America tends to
repel rather than attract. However, given the complexities of diversity and
identity, compulsion, for some unionists, may be the only option left to
counter fragmentation.
Unions, like all other institutions, face the omnipresent possibility of
capture by self-interested leaders or others. Capture may benefit the
ideological predispositions of union leaders or outsiders with whom the
leadership has formed a political or ideological bond.
97 For instance,
consistent with the actions of other labor hierarchs, John Sweeney, the
current president of America's largest public and private sector labor
federation, has tied the interests and the future of working people to the
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA)9s revolution,
99 defending the
filibuster of judicial nominees,'0 ° enhancing child support payments,
01
By an overwhelming 86% to 9% margin, workers want an organization run
jointly by employers and management, rather than an independent, employee-
run organization. By a smaller, but still sizable margin of 52% to 34%, workers
want an organization to be staffed and funded by the company, rather than
independently through employee contributions.
Id. at n.2 (quoting RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WORKER REPRESENTATION AND
PARTICIPATION SURVEY: REPORT ON THE FINDINGS 49 (1994)).
95. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1314.
96. Mike Wilkinson & Ron French, Labor Bosses Don't Share Workers' Pain-In
Tough Time, Leaders Still Gain as Workers Lose Ground, DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 14, 2007,
http://www.detnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/articleAID=/20070814/BIZ/708140392&imw=Y
(explaining that while workers have seen their health care and pension benefits gutted and
wages frozen, union leaders are likely to keep their jobs and get raises and thus contribute to
a widening pay gap between union members and leaders).
97. See, e.g., Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1382-83 (discussing
the capture of group resources for the purpose of achieving largely private benefits).
98. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 19.
99. Id. at 20 (asserting that the DSA, with its ties to the Progressive Caucus of the
Democratic Party, has apparently suggested a revolution complete with killing the
bourgeoisie with guns and knives).
100. See United Food and Clerical Workers Union (UFCW), Legislative & Political
Action Meeting Index, available at
http://www.ufcw.org/worker-political agenda/2005_legand-pol-action mtg/index.cfm.
101. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1382.
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class-consciousness and social upheaval, 10 2 and other causes,' °3 that appear
to yield few benefits for working people. Evidently, labor unions plan to
accomplish these goals by spending a larger percentage of members' dues
on the political education of members.' °4 Achieving the necessary social
and political changes that society requires includes, but is not limited to,
the transformation of the members into instruments of the union hierarchs'
agendas. This transmutation of traditional labor unions, duly understood as
part of "Michel's Iron Law of Oligarchy,"'0 5 yields self-interested benefits
for some people, including union leaders and others who happen to share
such opinions. 106 These developments manifest themselves as yet another
version of group-specific "rent-seeking behavior."'0 7 These maneuvers also
imply that the "hard left" has taken over public-sector, if not private-sector
unions, and increased the likelihood that the public interest and the interest
of rank and file workers have become permanently subordinated to special
interest.1
0 8
In order to fully comprehend the prospect of capture, one must note
that human self-interest0 9 can be found outside the confines of avaricious
greed or monetary self-interest, and therefore, there is a wide array of
explanations for the choices people make."0 A richer appreciation of self-
interest explains human behavior, including the possibility of group capture
by hierarchs and ideologues. Capture surfaces as hierarchs impose their
102. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 52.
103. Other causes apparently supported by union hierarchs include opposing a balanced
budget and supporting a freeze on nuclear weapons. Id. at 18.
104. Id. at 52.
105. Stewart J. Schwab, Union Raids, Union Democracy, and the Market for Union
Control, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 367, 370 (1992).
106. These outsiders include individuals who are not represented by the union. See, e.g.,
Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1381-84 (discussing how the outsiders
can get specific benefits).
107. Id. at 1383.
108. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 16-23.
109. MUELLER, supra note 74, at I (suggesting that politics and economics have been
typically divided "by the types of questions they ask, the assumptions they make about
individual motivation, and the methodologies they employ."). Political science has
presumed that politicians pursue the public interest. Id. "Economics has assumed that all
men pursue their private interest." Id. This dichotomy can no longer be seen as valid.
110. Jeffrey Friedman, Introduction to THE RATIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY 1, 20-21
(Jeffrey Friedman ed.,1996) (discussing instrumental rationality and its limits as well as
alternative views on how human choice is formed); see also AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS &
ECONOMICS 10-28 (1987) (suggesting rationality can be variously viewed as consistency, as
part of some self-interest determination, and as part of Adam Smith's understanding which,
taken together under Sen's analysis, implies that rationality must include more than narrow
self-interest in some purely pecuniary sense). But see DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 7 (1991) (suggesting that
self-interest simply means avaricious greed in a simple monetary sense and thus implying
that self-interest can be separated from ideological and nonmaterial considerations).
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individual preferences, provoking dissent and conflict within the unit. In
the contemporary world, self-interest is tied to the full panoply of goods
which include ideological, political and collective goods."' It is, therefore,
unsurprising that labor union hierarchs lend union support and financial
resources to activities that promote abortion, foment opposition to welfare
reform, 12 contest "three strikes and you're out" initiatives, and support
marijuana decriminalization." 3  Compounding this development, labor
unions appear to have succumbed to dominance by elite interest.'14 This
contention operates consistently with the observation that "[m]odem
thought is much more elitist than ancient thought, though it talks a less
elitist line.""' 5 This maneuver improves the odds that unions have
metamorphosed into bureaucratic instruments that serve largely private and
elite interests, as opposed to either the public interest, or the disparate
interests of the rank and file. From Dennis Mueller's analysis, we can
conclude that the incentives for the elites to engage in dominance and
capture increase "[w]here the benefits from collective action are not the
same across all group members."" 16  If that is the case, "there is a
systematic tendency for exploitation of the great by the small.""..7  Thus
even union majorities are not safe from exploitation.
If hierarchs decline to consider the disparate and conflicting
conceptions of human autonomy present in contemporary society, and
refrain from comprehending the variety of heterogeneous concepts that
inform the major premises from which the protagonists of debates argue, it
may cause difficulties. These difficulties, coupled with a refusal to adhere
to First Amendment norms, may combine to forecast that labor federations
and labor movements will be led by officials who insist on authoritarian
domination instead of democracy. This surfaces as a probability because
"[e]ven staunch union supporters blanche over the autocracy,
entrenchment, and corruption of some union leaders."" 8  But even if
majoritarian union democracy exists, majoritarianism places at risk a robust
111. See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for
Political Influence, 98 Q. J. OF ECON. 371, 372 (1983) (describing self-interested ways of
exerting political pressure).
112. See, e.g., CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 18.
113. Id.
114. TERRY EAGLETON, THE IDEA OF CULTURE 77 (2000) (stating that in an earlier time
the international and largely western labor movement spoke to the masses, but that today it
speaks to the elites); see also Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1343
(suggesting that if solidarity implies "the way of life of a particular people living together in
one place," as T.S. Elliot contends, unions and union leaders may no longer inhabit the same
place as rank and file payers of union dues).
115. BUDZISZEWSKI,supra note 58, at 164.
116. MUELLER, supra note 74, at 309.
117. Id.
118. Schwab, supra note 105, at 368.
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conception of diversity by offering instead a kind of shallow homogeneity
that supplants a richer, deeper, but more antagonistic diversity that appears
to be inescapably embedded in human life."' 9
Unionization dominated by elite interest and led by hierarchs may
result in manipulation that generates a disparity in benefits. This
movement reinforces the conclusion that contemporary unions are
epitomized by an absence of a shared understanding of the purpose and
place of workers in our society. Taken together, this model predicts that
mounting conflicts between workers and union hierarchs are inevitable.
Conflict is likely to intensify when compulsory union dues are seized and
placed into the service of politics and when (and if) the policy-related
benefits flow disproportionately to union leaders and their ideological
brethren. This paradigm comes alive with the dynamic specter of forced-
riding that requires rank and file members to shoulder the financial burden
necessary to obtain certain special interest 2 ° or collective goods' 2' while
reaping few, if any, benefits.
In the face of inevitable conflict, American society and some workers
have become captivated by postmodern viewpoints. Alternatively, many
workers remain animated by a principled conception of liberty of
conscience grounded in Bastiat's conception of the law.'22  If First
Amendment norms defensibly protect viewpoint diversity, conflicting labor
union meta-narratives'23 are placed at risk. Previously, labor movement
stories had the tenuous capacity to hold the workforce together. Today,
such stories face the possibility of escalating incredulity. 24  Although
group cooperation and solidarity may have been possible in a modern
119. ALEXANDER, supra note 55, at 170 (explaining how modem liberalism as
cosmopolitanism shallows out true diversity).
120. Special interest goods may provide excludable or non-excludable benefits to the
special interest group, but even if the benefits are not fully excludable, the benefits flow
disproportionately to some members of the group. See, e.g., P.A. McNuTr, THE ECONOMICS
OF PUBLIC CHOICE 180 (1996) (discussing how the benefits flow disproportionately to a
minority of the group).
121. Id. at 178 (discussing that although collective goods tend to provide nonexcludable
benefits, since they are provided through the political process, the benefits may flow
disproportionately to the sponsors of the collective goods).
122. See, e.g., BASTIAT, supra note 30, at 6-7 ("Life, liberty and property do not exist
because men have made laws. On the contrary, it was the fact that life, liberty and property
existed beforehand that caused men to make laws in the first place .... Thus since an
individual cannot lawfully use force against the person, liberty, or property of another
individual, then the common force [government]-for the same reason-cannot lawfully be
used to destroy the person, liberty or property of individuals or groups.").
123. Gedicks, supra note 11, at 1198 (relating postmodernism to general accounts of
human history independent of other contextual influences like culture and location).
124. See, e.g., McUsic & Selmi, supra note 47, at 1339-41 (explaining why women,
minorities and others have difficulty accepting the subversion of their own interest to the
presumed larger interest of unions' traditional constituencies).
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world committed to Enlightenment myths, the advent of postmodernism
marks both the end of modernity and a break with most, or all, universal
myths,'25 including the myth of the universal worker. 26  This move
provides language which makes it feasible to question the notion and
possibility of human progress. It also supplies a foundation from which to
challenge unionism's putatively progressive impulses.
Unquestionably, postmodem implications, and even postmodernism
itself, ought to be embraced with caution rather than enthusiasm because
the deficiencies in postmodem implications may impair postmodemism's
ability to reclaim liberty and First Amendment values. In fact, it may be
difficult to define First Amendment values through postmodem discourse.
Some, but not all, postmodern individuals might be accurately described as
uncommitted, restless, ever-open, conversion prone, and "therefore
congenitally ready to be converted and reconverted ad nauseam-without
the conviction that would stop the dizzying spin and allow them to be at
home somewhere."' 127 Postmodem individuals of the more serious variety
may be influenced by Simone Weil's insight. She writes: "We possess
nothing in this world other than the power to say I.,,128 Then again, a
postmodern thinker might be captivated by the Nietzchean self-mastery and
the will to power. 129 Other postmodem individuals may be consumed by
the grand pursuit of identity construction that is based on ethnicity, gender,
or in a purely suburban move, the body. 30 This particular approach may
crumple into an enduring fascination with cookbooks and health foods.'3 '
This approach also gives rise to the question of whether we postmodern
individuals, or modem thinkers of any and all varieties, have the purpose to
match our techniques. This is because the near-omnipotence, or presumed
omnipotence, of our means of freedom may double back to join hands with
the apparent emptiness of our ends. 3 2 Postmodemism, then, raises more
questions than it can possibly answer.'3 3 Equally likely, postmodern
125. Gedicks, supra note 11, at 1199 (linking the end of universal myths, like that of
Enlightenment, and the demise of modernity with the beginning of postmodemism).
126. McUsic & Selmi, supra note 47, at 1341 (discussing the possible subversion of
varieties of human identity to the purported interest of the "universal worker").
127. Os GUINNESS, THE CALL: FINDING AND FULFILLING THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF YOUR
LIFE 10 (2003)
128. Id. at 18.
129. Id. at 22.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Normatively, one may not necessarily be persuaded by the fluent individualism of
postmodernism because its anti-foundationalism may merely denote the contemporary
manifestation of Sophism. BUDZISZEWSKI, supra note 58, at 167. Correctly understood, this
new form of Sophism appears to deny reality, while resisting any notion of truth that
endeavors to make sense out of life. Id. In addition, the complete acceptance of
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thought gives rise to other critical concerns that limit the viability, if not the
coherence of postmodern discourse.'34
Nonetheless, workers increasingly enticed by "expressive
individualism," which focuses on subjective self-realization, are less likely
to find attractive any collective action that requires individual interests to
yield to group interest and group solidarity.'35 This diminishes the demand
for unionism and collectivization and emphasizes the notion that each
individual has the right to decide the proper ends of her life.,3 6  This
attitude reinforces workers' First Amendment interest in establishing
referenda, legislation and adjudication that endeavor to eliminate labor
union's authority to extract funds from dissenters. At the same time dissent
expands. Postmodern analysis signals that unions have always represented
a diverse group of workers-a fact that has been often overlooked. Labor
unions have ignored traditional, yet pervasive, sources of diversity
including: religion, ethnicity, gender, politics and ideology. Additionally,
labor unions appear to have disregarded the necessity and urgency of the
modem search for the purpose of life. Sociologist Os Guinness illustrates
this search as follows:
The question his own life-purpose, is what drove the Danish
thinker Soren Kierkegaard in the nineteenth century. As he
realized well, personal purpose is not a matter of philosophy or
theory. It is not purely objective, and it is not inherited like a
legacy. Many a scientist has an encyclopedic knowledge of the
world, many a philosopher can survey vast systems of thought,
many a theologian can unpack the profundities of religion, and
many a journalist can seemingly speak on any topic raised. But
all that is theory and, without a sense of personal purpose,
vanity."'
Postmodemism can exists in two senses. Postmodem thought can surface
in an aspirational or a descriptive sense. Postmodem thought can also
postmodemist claims reifies particularism and its complete rejection of universalist claims.
EAGLETON, supra note 114, at 76. This move has the potential to completely sever the
individual from society. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1338.
134. Postmodern scholars contend that there is no such thing as truth. See, e.g., RICHARD
RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY 5 (1989). If Rorty's postmodern claim is
correct, then contemporary man may be left without the means to identify the good.
Therefore, he will remain ignorant of how the evil he identifies has come about, even
though his intuition tells him he is seeing evil. DELSOL, supra note 36, at 52. If we are in
fact able to identify absolute evil in the world, that forces us to believe that an order exists
beyond our will, and beyond our capacity as creators of order, thus placing into issue the
subjective morality of our time. Id. at 53.
135. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union Dues, supra note 3, at
453.
136. Id.
137. Os GUINNESS, supra note 127, at 3.
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emerge in an authoritarian impulse that demands that government power
be employed to enforce, rather than to recognize the existence and
implications of identity and difference. To the extent that postmodern
claims are grounded in mandatory and normative demands for enforceable
recognition, it may lead a government to alter the terms of civil association
in ways that will neither resolve problems nor bring about social
harmony. 3 8 For purposes of this Article, I have attempted to understand
postmodernism in its former, as opposed to latter, sense.
This Article concentrates largely on free speech issues, but it seems
clear that both coerced agency fees, like speech, and accompanying
coerced association have the capacity to intrude on the integrity of
individual identity and intellectual individualism, even if courts are
inclined to limit such intrusions. 139 Litigation in this arena concentrates on
whether unions should be able to extract and expend funds when the
challenged expenditures violate a person's liberty interests. Adjudication
turns on the constitutional values that are implicated by the challenged
expenditure. 140  Postmodernism may reinforce this controversy by
providing additional analytical intensity that allows the depth of difference,
disagreement and conflict within American society and its workers to
surface.
III. DISCOVERING CORE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN UNION DUES
ADJUDICATION?
A. Grounds for Skepticism
Observers ought to be cautious about embracing the Supreme Court's
First Amendment jurisprudence for many reasons. The Supreme Court did
not actively protect the freedom of speech and expression until the end of
the first quarter of the twentieth century."4 For much of the twentieth
century the Court was unclear regarding the standards to be used in this
arena. 42 Only during the last third of the twentieth century did the Court
develop its basic framework for regulating governmental restrictions on
138. CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, THE FRATERNAL CONCEIT: INDIVIDUALIST VERSUS
COLLECTIVIST IDEAS OF COMMUNITY 2 (1991) (on file with author).
139. Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson 's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles
to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REV. 817, 865-66 (1986) (discussing
employee reaction to forced association with unions in workplaces that have unions, even if
the dissident does not believe in the union's actions).
140. Hartley, supra note 3, at 82-83. In fairness to Hartley, he is primarily concerned
with challenged expenditures premised on ideological grounds within the private sector. Id.
141. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1130 (7th ed.
2004).
142. Id.
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expressive activity.143 Although the Supreme Court has suggested that the
state cannot compel union members, or workers who are represented by a
union, to make contributions for political purposes unrelated to collective
bargaining, 4 4 the Court's freedom of speech decisions continue to provide
as much ground for skepticism as philosophers' claims that rights can be
understood as universal. For example, dissenters recently challenged a
government program that required certain farm producers to subsidize an
advertising campaign promoting generic goods. 45  The Supreme Court
acknowledged a free speech right not to be compelled to contribute to an
organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's freedom of
belief. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the program on grounds that such
assessments are germane to the regulatory program and because a program
that requires objectors to pay such assessments cannot be said to engender
any crisis of conscience. 46 The Court's modem moral claim hints at three
possibilities: (1) that some background principle can be invoked to avoid
invalidating a particular government program, (2) that the courts have the
capacity to know and adequate resources to explain what provokes a crisis
of conscience, and (3) that First Amendment adjudication is highly flexible.
Interestingly, this is not the first time the Court has invoked moral
principles to decide the scope of an individual's liberty interests. In a
leading equal protection case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,147 the Court appeared equally willing to ground its
decision in moral principle as opposed to social compromise. But then, in
what appears to have been a postmodem move, the Court assured us that it
was not bound by the plain meaning of its own words. 41 Instead,
responding to contemporary political and social pressures, which it had
pledged to disavow, the Court offered compromise and flexibility instead
of principle. This move appears to be mandated by the Court's desire to
avoid invalidating prior precedent 49 and perhaps by its desire to validate its
own version of cosmopolitan liberalism and self-evident truth. 5° Equally
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1163.
145. Id. at 1162.
146. Id. at 1162-63 (citing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457
(1997)).
147. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(holding the provisions restricting women were unconstitutional).
148. Id. at 865-66 (focusing on legal principles to overrule previous cases); see also
Hutchison, Freedom of Expression Rights in Public Schools, supra note 83, at 391
(discussing how the Court reasoned that it was basing its decision in Casey on principle and
not on political pressures or compromises).
149. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (recognizing the presence of political pressure, yet noting
that the Court is not swayed only by political pressure).
150. For a discussion of this possibility, see Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1558-60 (2004).
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possible, all union dues contributions, including those collected for
collective bargaining purposes may engender a moral crisis for
dissenters.' 5 ' However, courts haunted by the omnipresent specter of
compromise may be poised to vitiate the interest of dues objectors
regardless of how principled their dissent may be.
It is far from clear whether the Supreme Court possesses adequate
moral, philosophical and legal resources to clarify how the constitutive
components of a cognizable crisis of conscience are implicated within the
various debates about agriculture, abortion, or even union dues. Moral
principles as deployed by the Court appear to be rather elastic, available for
use when needed and absent from analysis when required. This validates
Christopher Shannon's intuition that "[fjor most of the modem era,
morality has been invoked as an alternative to nihilism. In our present
postmodem moment, morality has revealed itself to be nihilism."'
5 This
provocative claim is complemented by the allegation that rights are an
inherently Western invention that are simply made up and constructed by a
certain historical culture.'53  This also suggests some difficulty in
discovering sturdy universal moral principles to guide the courts. The
Court may have been captivated by language that renders the invocation of
morality and rights as nothing more than nihilism that has refashioned itself
as part of the cost of muddling through.'54 If such sentiments are correct,
all court opinions risk skepticism no matter how much we agree with the
judgment.
B. Legal Precedent
Retreating from skepticism in favor of conventional analysis for the
moment, the union dues controversy has provided precedent for future
courts to consider. Contemporary adjudication makes manifest that
"private and public sector workers who are not union members may be
obliged to pay 'agency fees' to recognized labor unions as a condition of
employment when and if the union-management contract requires such
151. See, e.g., Harpaz, supra note 139, at 865-66 (exploring the moral claims of
dissenters who assert all unwanted association violates their freedom of association).
152. CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, CONSPICUOUS CRITICISM: TRADITION, THE INDIVIDUAL,
AND CULTURE IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIAL THOUGHT 198 (rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that
there is no morality in American society).
153. WILLIAM A. EDMUNDSON, AN INTRODUCTION To RIGHTS 3 (2004) (discussing
whether rights are universal or just a Western construct).
154. ALEXANDER, supra note 55, at 185-93 (noting that the process of muddling through
with respect to freedom of expression claims in a liberal society represents "practices that
have a rule-consequentialist structure of justification specific to particular kinds of questions
and to particular cultures, eras, and technologies").
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payments."' The Supreme Court first considered a challenge to
compulsory union dues in 1956'56 where it upheld the RLA as a valid
enactment of Congress under the commerce power designed to ensure
stability in the railroad industry. 5 7 Though the plaintiffs argued that the
union shop agreement "forces men into ideological and political
associations which violate their right to freedom of conscience, freedom of
association, and freedom of thought protected by the Bill of Rights,"'5 8 the
Court was not impressed. Implicating free-rider concerns, the Court stated
that the disputed statutory provision simply required workers to pay
financial support to the union "by all who receive the benefits of its
work."'5 9 The Court found this limited statutory enactment was within the
power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and did not violate either
the First or the Fifth Amendments of the Constitution. 60  The Court's
analysis confirmed that First Amendment freedoms of thought, conscience
and association do not invalidate the facial validity of union shop
agreements. Freedom of expression, however, remained a possible basis
for future relief' 62 "[i]f other conditions are in fact imposed, or if the
exaction of dues, initiation fees, or assessments is used as a cover for
forcing ideological conformity or other action in contravention of the First
Amendment.',
163
Moving beyond facial validity of union shop agreements, the Court
next confronted the allegation that a labor union is not entitled to compel a
worker to pay dues when such monies were, in substantial part, used to
finance the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom the
dues objector opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and
economic doctrines, concepts and ideologies with which he disagreed.' 64 In
International Association of Machinists v. Street, the issue concerned the
use of funds for purposes other than collective bargaining. First, we should
note that the Court attempted by statutory construction to avoid dealing
with the constitutionality of a union devotion of compulsory dues to
political causes to which the employee payer objected. 165  Instead, it
155. Beck v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 468 F. Supp. 93, 96 (D. Md. 1979).
156. Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
157. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 916.
158. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 236.
159. Id. at 238.
160. Id.
161. Id.; see also GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 916-17 (discussing the relationship
between the First Amendment and union shop agreements).
162. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 916-17.
163. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238.
164. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 744 (1961).
165. Id. at 748-49 ("Federal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of
their constitutionality."); but see id. at 785 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court
should not rewrite the statute in order to avoid decisions on constitutional questions).
2008]
686 U. PA. JOURNAL OF BUSINESS AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 10:3
justified the imposition of dues in order to deal with the free-rider
problem. 66 The Court, nonetheless, found that expending dues funds for
political purposes was problematic. However problematic, the Supreme
Court did not seem interested in remedies that would securely vindicate the
First Amendment interests of dues objectors. The Court rejected the most
direct remedy offered by the state court-an injunction against the union
shop provision 67-and as a substitute, the Court would permit union
expenditures on political causes premised on the freedom of expression
rights of the union majority. This approach does little to deal with an
alternative conception of free speech that disallows all coerced speech in
order to prevent all union attempts to enforce ideological conformity.
Two years after its decision in Street, "the Supreme Court clarified its
position on the appropriate remedies in Brotherhood of Railway Clerks v.
Allen., 169 The "Court invited the defendant unions to consider the adoption
of some internal union plan providing for the designation of political
expenditures, the manifestation of objections by members unwilling to
contribute to such expenditures and an appropriate reduction in the moneys
exacted from such objecting members."17 The Court's approach invites
those with the greatest access to information, the most influence on
accounting procedures, and who are most likely to engage in a First
Amendment violation to control the process that is designed to preclude
ideological conformity.
Although earlier Supreme Court opinions had avoided dealing directly
with the constitutionality of a union's use of coerced dues for political
causes,17 ' the Court had to confront this issue directly in Abood 
7 2 Abood
"involved a collective bargaining agreement covered not by the National
Labor Relations Act or the Railway Labor Act but rather by the state law of
Michigan."' 7 3 "Under Michigan law, public sector employers and unions
are authorized to agree to agency shop provisions"'
7 4 and the Michigan
court construed the state statute to authorize the "use of such agency fees
for purposes other than collective bargaining. '  Dues objectors first
166. Id. at 761-63.
167. Id. at 771.
168. See id. at 773 (discussing how the majority of the union has an interest in stating its
views).
169. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 918.
170. Id.; see also Bhd. of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963) (encouraging
petitioner unions to consider the adoption of some voluntary plan by which dissenters would
be afforded an internal union remedy).
171. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 918.
172. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
173. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 918.
174. Abood, 431 U.S. at211.
175. Id. at 232.
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emphasized that government employment was involved, which directly
implicated "constitutional guarantees in contrast to the private employment
that was the subject of the Hanson and Street decisions."' 7 6 Second, the
plaintiffs/appellants argued "that in the public sector collective bargaining
is inherently 'political' and that to require them to give financial support to
[such bargaining] is to require 'ideological conformity' that the court
expressly found lacking in Hanson."'77 The Court found neither argument
persuasive.'78 Still, the Supreme Court determined that the exaction of
funds to pay for the challenged expenditures, "over the protest of
involuntary dues payers, interfered with their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights and was unconstitutional."' 7 9
This case has legs because "the principles announced there have been
invoked in subsequent private-sector cases."'"8 Ensuing cases verify that
political activities subject non-members to the risk of ideological
conformity in violation of their free speech rights. On the other hand, since
unions have incentives to engage in less than transparent accounting
practices,' prudent observers should be wary of surrendering to Gorman
& Finkin's contention that "it is relatively easy to identify when a union is
expending dues moneys on 'ideological causes' and political candidates. '
In Ellis"3 the Court provided a standard for deciding RLA cases. In
Ellis, the complaining agency-fee payers acknowledged the legality of the
agency-shop provision in the collective-bargaining contract between
Western Airlines and the labor union.8 4 Still, they argued that dues
objectors could not be compelled to contribute "more than their pro rata
share of the expenses of negotiating agreements and settling grievances
with Western Airlines."'8 5 The union conceded that the statute authorizing
the union shop did not permit the use of petitioners' contributions for union
political or ideological activities. Instead, they adopted a rebate program
covering such expenditures. 86 The parties disagreed "about the adequacy
176. Id. at 226.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 919; see also Abood, 431 U.S. at 236-37
(arguing that constitutional principles embedded in the First and Fourteenth Amendment
prohibit unions from requiring any of the union dissidents to contribute to the support of an
ideological cause that he may oppose as a condition of holding a job as a public school
teacher).
180. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 919.
181. See infra Part III.C (discussing how precedent can be used to reclaim First
Amendment values).
182. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 919.
183. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
184. Id. at 439.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 439-40.
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of the rebate scheme, and about the legality of burdening objecting
employees with six specific union expenses."'
8 7  The Supreme Court
provided the following standard for RLA cases:
[O]bjecting employees may be compelled to pay their fair share
of not only the direct costs of negotiating and administering a
collective-bargaining contract and of settling grievances and
disputes, but also the expenses of activities or undertakings
normally or reasonably employed to implement or effectuate the
duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees
in the bargaining unit.18
Applying this rule, the Court permitted union convention expenses,
social activities, general publication expenditures, and litigation expenses
that are directly related to the bargaining unit to be chargeable to union
dues objectors."8 9 Concluding that Congress did not intend the union shop
to aid the union in recruiting new members outside the bargaining unit, the
Court found such expenses impermissible.'9" Although this case was
decided under the RLA, the Court's decision four years later in
Communications Workers of America v. Beck signaled that the same
governing principles apply under the NLRA.' 9'
In Beck, the Supreme Court had to decide whether an exclusive
bargaining agreement within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA
92
"permits a union, over the objections of dues-paying nonmember
employees, to expend funds so collected on activities unrelated to
collective bargaining, contract administration, or grievance adjustment,
and, if so, whether such expenditures violate the union's duty of fair
representation or the objecting employees' First Amendment rights."'
93
Decisions under the NLRA are made more complicated by virtue of the
existence of an administrative agency, the NLRB. The Court of Appeals
held that "because courts have jurisdiction over challenges to union-
security clauses negotiated under § 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act
(RLA)... which is in all material respects identical to § 8(a)(3), there must
be a parity of federal jurisdiction over § 8(a)(3) claims."'
94 Questions arise
because unlike the NLRA, the RLA "establishes no agency charged with
administering its provisions, and instead leaves it to the courts to determine
the validity of activities challenged under the Act."'
95 The Supreme Court
187. Id. at 435.
188. Id. at 448.
189. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 923.
190. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 451.
191. GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 5, at 921-22.
192. 29 U.S.C. 158 (a)(3) (2000).
193. Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 738 (1988).
194. Id. at 742-43.
195. Id. at 743.
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answered this question by stating that the "primary jurisdiction of the
NLRB ... cannot be diminished by analogies to the RLA, for in this regard
the two labor statutes do not parallel one another.' 96 Still, the Court
insisted "that § 8(a)(3) like its statutory equivalent, § 2, Eleventh of the
RLA, authorizes the exaction of only those fees and dues necessary to
'performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in
dealing with the employer on labor-management issues."" 97 The Court
concluded that while the NLRB has primary jurisdiction to decide unfair
labor practice claims, the federal courts have collateral jurisdiction to
decide unfair labor practice claims arising out of an asserted violation of
the duty of fair representation.'98 The district court found that only twenty
one percent of the union's funds were expended on collective-bargaining
activities.' 99 The district court also found that "the union's collection and
disbursement of agency fees for purposes other than bargaining unit
representation violated the associational and free speech rights of objecting
nonmembers. '"200 On the other hand, convinced by Congress' free-riding
rhetoric, the Supreme Court justified the application of § 8(a)(3) to all
workers, 21' but declined to decide Beck on First Amendment grounds.
In a subsequent case that arose in the public-sector, the Supreme Court
in Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association engaged in a detailed inspection of
disputed union expenditures by the Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), an
affiliate of the Michigan Education Association (MEA) and the National
Education Association (NEA).2°2 The FFA served as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the faculty of Ferris State College, a public
institution established under the Michigan Constitution and funded by the
State. 20 3 The Supreme Count articulated the following rule:
Hanson and Street and their progeny teach that chargeable
activities must (1) be "germane" to collective-bargaining activity;
(2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in labor
peace and avoiding "free riders"; and (3) not significantly add to
the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of
an agency or union shop.
20 4
The Court refused to require unions to "demonstrate a direct and
tangible impact upon the dissenting employee's unit" before the challenged
196. Id.
197. Id. at 762-63.
198. Id. at 743.
199. Id. at 740.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 750.
202. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 527-32 (1991).
203. Id. at 512.
204. Id. at 519.
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union activity could become chargeable. 20 5 This refusal has consequences
because it may encourage subsequent courts to conclude that a union does
not act unlawfully by charging expenses that are206 "for services that may
ultimately inure to the benefit of the members of the local union .. .
This may be a mistake "because virtually any activity may ultimately inure
to the benefit of members., 20 8 Indeed, the Court. accepted the allegation
that a local union's affiliation relationship with the national unit may
provide "considerable economic, political and information resources when
the local is in need of them.
20 9 The Court's decision appears to allow
activities that are questionable on their face to be charged to dues objectors.
But, invoking Ellis, the Court held that the challenged expenses must be
related to the union's "statutory functions" and its "overall bargaining
goals." 
2 10
Specifically, the Supreme Court disallowed the costs of a Preserve
Public Education (PPE) program designed to secure funds for public
education in Michigan because none of these activities were shown to be
oriented toward the ratification or implementation of petitioners'
collective-bargaining agreement and none could be chargeable to
objectors. 21  Litigation expenses that fail to concern the dissenting
employees' bargaining unit are also nonchargeable.
212 The Supreme Court
determined that certain public relations expenditures designed to enhance
the reputation of the teaching profession were impermissible because such
activities involved speech of a political nature in a public forum.
1 3 In
addition, there is little connection between such expenditures and the
union's collective-bargaining mission.1
4
On the other hand, the Supreme Court, consistent with its judgment
that a union can charge objectors for activities that the union did not
undertake directly on behalf of persons within the bargaining unit, allowed
certain NEA program expenditures destined for states other than
Michigan. 215  The Court reasoned that such costs are part of general
collective-bargaining expenditures of the state or national parent union and
are therefore germane.2 16  Similarly, expenses related to teaching and
205. Id. at 522.
206. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1385.
207. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 524 (emphasis added).
208. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1385.
209. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 523.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 527.
212. Id. at 528.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 527.
216. Id.
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education generally were permissible because such activities provided
benefits for all, even though they were not directly related to bargaining
unit concerns.217 On comparable grounds, certain convention expenditures
incurred by both the state and national unit were found to be chargeable."' 8
Oddly, the Court allowed the union to charge objectors for expenses related
to the preparation of a strike, which all parties conceded would have been
illegal under Michigan Law.2 '9 The Court determined that if the union had
"actually engaged in an illegal strike, the union clearly could not have
charged the expenses incident to that strike to petitioners." 220 But
surrendering to speculation, the Court accepted that preparation for an
illegal strike may strengthen the hands of the union and finding that "these
expenses are substantively indistinguishable from those appurtenant to
collective-bargaining negotiations" it allowed these expenditures to be
chargeable to dues objectors. 22 ' Because of the possibilities associated with
language such as "strengthen" or "ultimately inure to the benefit of
workers" combined with the failure to require that chargeable activities
must provide a "direct and tangible benefit," Supreme Court jurisprudence
appears to be highly contingent. The relevant question becomes, how far
can the rules of decision drift from the idea that the First Amendment has
substantive, as opposed to, linguistic content? One possible answer may be
found in a recent appellate court decision rendered by the Ninth Circuit.
Consider the United Food case. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, finding that organizing is central to the purpose of the NLRA,22z
issued a decision that allowed union organizing expenditures to be
extracted from union dissenters.223  History may be helpful in
understanding the evolution of this case. More than two decades ago, the
U.S. Supreme Court categorically reversed a Ninth Circuit decision in Ellis
regarding what constitutes a germane expenditure within the meaning of
the RLA.224 In Ellis, the Ninth Circuit, had held that labor organizations
were "entitled to charge [dues objectors] for their pro rata share of the
union's organizing . . . expenses., 225  The Supreme Court's reversal
specified that "[o]rganizing money is spent on people who are not union
217. Id. at 529.
218. Id. at 529-30.
219. Id. at 530-32.
220. Id. at 531.
221. Id. at 532.
222. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
768 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
223. Id. at 768-69 (adopting the NLRB's findings and determining that the Board's
analysis is "in accord with the economic realities of collective bargaining, as well as with
the language and purposes of the NLRA.").
224. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,457 (1984).
225. Id.
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members, and only in the most distant way works to the benefit of those
who already pay dues. 226 Such expenditures are a "far cry from the free-
rider problem with which Congress was concerned.,
227  "The Court of
Appeals found that organizing expenses could be charged to objecting
employees because organizing efforts are aimed toward a stronger union,
which in turn would be more successful at the bargaining table.,
228 The
Supreme Court determined this "attenuated connection with collective
bargaining [was] . . . outside Congress' authorization.,
229 Despite this
reversal, sixteen years later, the Ninth Circuit, once again, held that such
activities were chargeable to dissenters. It offers the following reason.
Although "organizing, which is conducted for the general purpose of
strengthening the union, is not germane to collective bargaining under the
RLA, the extra-bargaining unit organizing of competitor employers,
230 can
be germane under the NLRA so long as the administrative agency says
so. 231 Based largely on deference to the NLRB, the Ninth Circuit
distinguished activities that are nonchargeable under the RLA from the
same activities arising under the NLRA. From the Ninth Circuit's
perspective, an objective of strengthening unions, vetted by an
administrative agency, may ultimately inure to the economic benefit of all
workers.
Conversely, a number of earlier cases found organizing expenses to be
nonchargeable under the NLRA, the RLA, and public sector bargaining
statutes. 232 The Supreme Court offers instruction on this issue. In Beck, the
Court stated that since section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA and section 2, eleventh
of the RLA "are in all material respects identical,,
233 RLA cases are "more
than merely instructive," they are controlling for purposes of understanding
the free-rider approach taken by Congress.
234  If the Supreme Court is
correct, it can be argued that union organizing expenditures are
nonrepresentational and hence nonchargeable as a matter of law. That is,
unless a court informed by exceptional insight can discover a tenable basis
226. Id. at 453.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 451.
229. Id.
230. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
771 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
231. Id. at 774-75.
232. See Beck v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 776 F.2d 1187, 1211-12 (4th Cir. 1985)
(declaring organizing to be nonchargeable); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 643 F. Supp.
1306, 1324 (W.D. Mich. 1986) (relying on Ellis and holding organizing nonchargeable in
the public sector); United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 1099, 327 N.L.R.B. 1237,
1244 (1999) (relying on Ellis to hold that organizing was nonchargeable under the NLRA);
see also Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1367-69.
233. Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745-47 (1988).
234. Id. at 746-47.
UNION DUES RESTRICTIONS
to escape the preclusive effect of both Ellis and Beck. The Ninth Circuit is
just such a court. Although the U.S. Supreme Court denied a writ of
certiorari, 35 and though there is reason to disagree with the United Food
court's analysis, 236 the importance of the case lies elsewhere. The Ninth
Circuit stakes its analytical powers on the contention that the ongoing
decline in union density rates provides a justifiable basis to convert
nonrepresentational activities into "germane," and therefore chargeable
ones. This claim along with similarly capacious ones has the clout to
swallow First Amendment values.
C. Does Precedent Reclaim First Amendment Values?
The Supreme Court, without necessarily drawing precise lines
confirms that private-sector union political and ideological activities are not
constitutionally chargeable to dissenting employees.237  Similarly, in
Abood, the Court made a determination that a union utilizing an individual
agency-shop agreement to force dissenting employees to subsidize
ideological activities impermissibly impinges on objectors' rights within a
public-employment context.238 Government "may not require an individual
to relinquish rights guaranteed him by the First Amendment as a condition
of public employment. 239 Perhaps anticipating a dilemma that postmodern
conflict makes plain, the Court states that because unions "traditionally
have aligned themselves with a wide range of social, political and
ideological viewpoints, any number of which might bring vigorous
disapproval from individual employees, [forcing] employees to contribute
... to the promotion of such positions implicate[s] core First Amendment
concerns."2 40 "Freedom of thought [as a core value] protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all."24'
Although union dissenters might have reason to applaud such
reasoning, difficulties remain. At least four questions suggest themselves
including: (a) what counts as an ideological, political or otherwise
nongermane expenditure; (b) do accounting issues cloud the proper answer
to the first question; (c) is state action required to implicate pure freedom of
speech and association analysis or are such considerations simply lurking
235. Mulder v. NLRB, 537 U.S. 1024 (2002).
236. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1368-94 (showing why the
Ninth Circuit's analysis is unconvincing).
237. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 515 (1991) (citing Bhd. of Ry.
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963)).
238. Id. at 516 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977)).
239. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977).
240. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 516.
241. Id. at 516-17 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)).
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in the background, particularly in private-sector cases; and (d) does free-
riding analysis justify specific decisions taken by either the courts or the
administrative agency.
First, labor unions aware of judicial precedent have an incentive to
shield ideological and other nonrepresentational expenditures from
scrutiny. A truthful response to the question of which expenditures are
expended impermissibly may deprive unions of such funds. Unions have
reason to blur the lines between germane and nongermane expenditures by
suggesting that all expenditures are required to fulfill their collective-
bargaining role. In addition, unions have not taken kindly to efforts by
dues objectors to invoke their First Amendment rights. Dues objectors are
likely to find the path of dissent "marked by threats of life and family,
intimidation, insults and coercion." '242 These difficulties are aggravated by
the readiness of some courts to classify highly debatable union
expenditures as germane even where the Supreme Court has reached the
opposite opinion based on similar facts.243 On the other hand, Justice
Scalia would hold "that any charge that does not relate to an activity
expressly authorized by statute is constitutionally invalid, irrespective of its
impact or lack thereof, on free expression." 244 The majority opinion in
Lehnert criticized Justice Scalia's approach as overly rigid because it failed
to "acknowledge the practicalities of the complex interrelationship between
public employers, employees, unions, and the public, 2 4 but given such
complexity, rigidity may bring welcome clarity.
Second, unions have predictably resisted requests to provide workers
with information backed by an independent audit that conforms to ordinary
norms of auditing. In the private-sector, resistance has been frequently
supported by the NLRB.246 Indeed "[t]he Board [has] held that unions have
no obligation to tell employees ... what percentage of dues are spent on
nonrepresentational activities., 247  On the other hand, the Department of
242. Joe Knollenberg, The Changing of the Guard: Republicans Take on Labor and the
Use of Mandatory Dues or Fees for Political Purposes, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 347, 364
(1998).
243. See supra Part III.B. (discussing the legal precedent concerning first amendment
rights in union dues adjudication).
244. Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 526 (discussing Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
245. Id. at 526.
246. See Ferriso v. NLRB, 125 F.3d 865, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (disagreeing with the
NLRB and holding that if a union collects a compulsory agency fee, it is "required to
provide [nonmembers] ... with an independent audit"); Penrod v. NLRB, 203 F.3d 41, 45-
46 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (overruling the NLRB's refusal to require a complete and thorough
independent audit).
247. Penrod, 203 F.3d at 43.
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248Labor has engaged in a welcome effort to increase union transparency.
After litigating this issue before the U.S. Court of Appeals and losing, labor
unions have predictably returned to politics in an effort to diminish
transparency. Labor unions have succeeded in persuading the House of
Representatives to reduce the amount of federal funds devoted to enforcing
transparency norms which have highlighted labor unions' lavish spending
in the past.249
Third, the Supreme Court refuses to consistently state that freedom
from ideological conformity is firmly rooted in the Constitution and
deserves robust protection. In determining whether sufficient state action
exists to trigger First Amendment protection for private-sector cases arising
under either the RLA or the NLRA, the Court appears to have two
positions. For cases premised on the RLA, the Court conceded that
Hanson determined "that because the RLA pre-empts all state laws banning
union-security agreements, the negotiation and enforcement of such
provisions in railroad industry contracts involves 'governmental action'
and is therefore subject to constitutional limitations.""o For cases arising
under the NLRA, the Court has stated that it is simply not required to
decide that issue.25" ' While solicitous regarding First Amendment issues,
the Court appears to prefer to escape grounding its decisions in the
Constitution. Instead, it works around the Constitution and discovers an
alternative basis for granting relief to dues objectors or rules against them.
In the Beck case, for instance, the Court found that the duty of fair
representation constituted a sufficient basis to grant dues objector's relief
despite the District court's determination that "[the] disbursement of
agency fees for purposes other than bargaining unit representation violated
the associational and free speech right of objecting nonmembers. '' 25 2 The
Supreme Court avoided implicating the full import of its RLA decisions by
claiming that the states have power to outlaw union-security agreements
and hence "the federal pre-emption essential to Hanson's finding of
248. See Carl Horowitz, Union Accountability: Ruling Strengthens Financial Reporting,
but Concerns Remain on Pension Funds, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 6, 2005, at 9A ("In a 3-
0 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, upheld a new set of
regulations issued by the Department of Labor that required unions to spell out in greater
detail how they spend their money.").
249. Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Extravagant Spending, N.Y. SuN, July 18, 2007, available
at http://www.nysun.com/article/58667 (writing that while the members of the
Appropriations Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives have voted to increase
funding of all other oversight offices in the Labor Department, the Committee has voted to
cut funds for the Office of Labor Management Standards which monitors union financial
disclosure and that many of the leaders of this effort received more than $100,000 in
political contributions from labor unions).
250. Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761 (1988).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 740 (discussing the lower court holding).
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governmental action is missing in the NLRA context." '253 Although the
Court's analysis of cases arising under the NLRA is not fully persuasive in
all respects, it is clear that sufficient governmental coercion exists in a
public employment context to implicate First Amendment rights.254
Fourth, adjudication is commonly driven with free riding
presumptions that are fortified by an insufficiently robust understanding of
human self-interest. Since I have discussed judicial free riding deficiencies
extensively elsewhere,255 I offer only two points here. First, labor unions
are made up of diverse workers with disparate interests and preferences,
and therefore, consistent with the parameters of postmodern discourse and
Madisonian assumptions, it is impossible to believe that workers
necessarily share a common interest. In the absence of a common interest,
the likelihood of free riding by dissenting workers plummets.
While strategic behavior within a labor union setting may create
plausible opportunities that produce positive externalities
wherein individuals obtain goods without bidding for them, free
riding produced by interest convergence may not necessarily
exist-since interest convergence itself may not exist. In
neoclassical economic and welfare terms, the disutility associated
with mandatory union membership may outweigh the putative
utility (if any exists at all) of such membership.256
The pursuit of special-interest goods provides concentrated (largely
private) benefits to the few.257 When courts and administrative agencies
frame this pursuit exclusively as a limited search for economic benefits
obtainable by represented workers including union dissenters, this
maneuver supplies cover for the true beneficiaries' self-interest.
218
"Operationally, judicial cover is provided by an inadequate search for all
self-interested benefits attached to the challenged union activity. 259 Since
253. Id. at 761.
254. See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (finding that
appellants could refuse to associate with a union's spending program that required them to
contribute to political candidates and to express political views unrelated to the union's
duties as the exclusive bargaining representative).
255. See, e.g., Hutchison, Reclaiming the Union Movement Through Union Dues, supra
note 3, at 483-92 (describing types of free and forced riding); see also Hutchison, A
Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1388-90 (disputing the courts and Judge Richard
Posner's free riding approach).
256. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1324-25.
257. See Jane S. Shaw, Public Choice Theory, in THE FORTUNE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS 150-51 (David R. Henderson ed., 1993) (pointing out that because voters are
often rationally ignorant, legislators may be captured by lobbying groups who provide
campaign funds in exchange for support for legislation that may provide largely private
benefits for the group).
258. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1391.
259. Id.
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self-interest implicates both economic and ideological goals, engaging in
an inadequate search enables courts to overlook self-interested benefits
(private externalities) that disproportionately accrue to union hierarchs and
union outsiders that may have captured the union, its policymaking and its
revenues. 260 This move permits courts to overestimate the self-interested
benefits obtainable by represented workers in connection with any
contestable union expenditure. The adverse effects of this move for dues
objectors is worsened because the Supreme Court fails to require that
unions demonstrate a direct and tangible impact upon the dues objector's
unit before the contested activity becomes chargeable. Instead the courts
allow unions to charge for services that may ultimately inure to the benefit
of the local union.261 Unions, thus, have wide scope for their activities.
IV. THE DAVENPORT CASE
The Davenport case represents the consolidation of two cases that
have endured a long and torturous litigation process. The issue to be
decided was whether a Washington State Fair Campaign Practices
Initiative, as applied to public sector unions, was permissible.
A. The Washington State Courts
Washington State voters adopted an initiative amending the state's
regulation of political contributions and campaign expenditures during the
fall of 1992.262 The amendment, also known as § 760, constrains labor
unions in the following manner: "A labor organization may not use agency
shop fees paid by an individual who is not a member of the organization to
make contributions or expenditures to influence an election or to operate a
political committee, unless affirmatively authorized by the individual.2 63
260. Id.
261. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 524 (1991) (holding that a local
bargaining representative may charge objecting employees for their share of the costs
associated with other chargeable activities of its state and national affiliates, even if those
activities were not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting employees' direct
bargaining unit).
262. Initiative Measures-Political Contributions and Campaign Expenditures, 1993
Wash. Legis. Serv. (West) (1993).
263. Initiative Measures-Political Contributions and Campaign Expenditures, 1993
Wash. Legis. Serv. (West), Part III, § 16 (1993); see also, Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n,
127 S. Ct. 2372, 2377-78 (2007) (citing § 760 as it stood when the trial court decision was
rendered). Subsequently, the initiative was amended in 2007. This amended version of the
initiative does not concern us here except as an illustration of the fragility of state initiatives.
Washington has since adopted an amended version of the initiative to codify a narrower
interpretation of the "use" of agency-shop fees than the interpretation adopted by the trial
court. See, e.g., Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377 n.l (citing that this amendment does not
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The respondent union, the WEA, litigated its extraction of
nonmembers' agency fees in two lawsuits. 264 Both suits claimed that the
respondent's use of agency fees was in violation of § 760.265 The
Washington State Supreme Court held that § 760 was unconstitutional
within the meaning of United States Supreme Court precedents.2 66
The WEA is the exclusive bargaining agent for approximately 70,000
state educational employees and membership in the union is voluntary.267
But members and nonmembers must contribute to the WEA for the costs
related to collective bargaining. Per statute, members pay dues to the
union; nonmembers pay agency shop fees, which are equivalent to member
dues. 26' Accepting the allegation that it is well settled that a union, which
is obliged to act on behalf of all employees in the bargaining unit, may
charge nonunion employees to bear their "fair share" of the costs of
representation 269 and basking in the assertion that Washington has a long
and proud history of being a pioneer in the protection of employee 
rights, 270
the Washington State Supreme Court approved agency shop provisions that
require the deduction from nonmembers' salary of fees equivalent to union
dues.271' The state court acknowledged that a "portion of members' dues
goes to support political and ideological causes, which are unrelated to the
union's collective bargaining activities ' 27 2 and determined that these
expenses are typically called non-chargeable expenses.2 73  However non-
chargeable such expense may be, in order for nonmembers to escape from
objectionable political and ideological expenses, they must submit to a
rebate procedure requiring compliance with opt-out rules set forth by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Hudson.274
affect the court's analysis of whether § 760's affirmative-authorization violates the
constitutional rights of respondent).
264. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2378 (citing two lawsuits claiming that respondent's use of
agency fees was in violation of § 760).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 2377-78.
268. State ex rel. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm'n v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 130 P.3d
352, 354 (Wash. 2006).
269. Id. at 354 n. 1 (citing a Supreme Court case in which the Court found it was well
settled that a union could require nonunion employees to bear their fair share of the costs of
representation).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 354 n.2.
272. Id. at 354.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 365. Hudson's minimum constitutionally permissible standard apparently
includes as a predicate to a union's collection of agency fees: (A) an adequate explanation
of the basis for the fee, (B) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge the amount of the
fee before an impartial decision-maker and (C) an escrow for the amount reasonably in
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Dissenting agency-fee payors were sent Hudson packets, but failed to
comply with the Hudson's procedures. 275 Though the union's approach did
not satisfy § 760's affirmative-authorization requirement as a matter of
state law, the state court, nevertheless, invalidated the initiative because it
imposed rules on unions that violated the First Amendment of the Federal
276Constitution. The state supreme court decision found that United States
Supreme Court's agency-fee jurisprudence established a balance between
the First Amendment rights of unions and of nonmembers, and that § 760
required heightened First Amendment scrutiny because it deviated from
that balance by imposing on the union the burden of confirming that a
nonmember does not object to the expenditure of his agency fees for
electoral purposes.277 Further, the court "held that § 760 interfered with
respondent's expressive associational rights under Boy Scouts ofAmerica v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (200o).:,278
B. The Supreme Court Ruling
The U.S. Supreme Court's review of the consolidated case-
Davenport v. Washington Education Association-turned primarily on
whether the state's restriction on the use of labor unions' agency-shop fees
violated rather than reclaimed the First Amendment.279  The Court
concluded that the "National Labor Relations Act leaves States free to
regulate their labor relationships with their public employees. '280 States
have the authority to authorize a union and a government employer to enter
into what is commonly known as an agency-shop agreement. This
arrangement entitles the union to levy a fee on employees who are not
union members but who are represented by the union in collective
bargaining.28' Though the Court agreed that the primary purpose of this
arrangement is to prevent nonmembers from free riding on the union's
collective bargaining activities without sharing the costs incurred, the Court
acknowledged that public-sector agency-shop arrangements implicate First
Amendment concerns.282 The Court resolved that (A) compulsory dues
payments by nonmembers can only be sustained by the Court's free-riding
jurisprudence when the union engages in collective-bargaining efforts as
dispute while such challenges are pending. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S.
292, 310 (1986).
275. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2378 (2007).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2376.
280. Id. (citing 49 Stat. 450, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2)).
281. Id. at 2376-77.
282. Id. at 2377.
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opposed to union political advocacy or other non-germane actions and (B)
First Amendment values are implicated when agency-shop arrangements
compel individuals to contribute money to unions as a condition of
government employment.283
The basic argument advanced by the Washington Education
Association (WEA) for invalidating the Washington State Initiative-the
Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence in the agency-fee arena-
appeared to be less than credible. Hence, the entire Court had little trouble
dismissing most of the union's various contentions. First, the Court found
that "it is undeniably unusual for a government agency to give a private
entity the power, in essence, to tax government employees. 284 The state of
Washington had imposed only a modest limitation upon this extraordinary
power by conditioning the union's use of nonmembers' agency fees for
election-related purposes on each nonmember's prior consent.2"5 The union
admitted that the state could have gone further by "restricting public-sector
agency fees to the portion of union dues devoted to collective
bargaining., 286 Concluding that "it would be constitutional for Washington
to eliminate agency fees entirely, '287 the Supreme Court effectively issued
an invitation to all of the states to do likewise and insisted "that the far less
restrictive limitation the voters of Washington placed on respondent's
authorization to exact money from government employees is of no greater
constitutional concern.,
288
Secondly, the Supreme Court held that its agency-fee cases neither
balanced the constitutional rights of unions and nonmembers, nor dictated
that a nonmember must shoulder the burden of objecting before a union
could be barred from spending his fees for purposes impermissible under
Abood.289  Attempting to sustain its analysis, the Washington State
Supreme Court appealed to the following proposition: "'[D]issent is not to
be presumed-it must affirmatively be made known to the union by the
dissenting employee.' 290 This appeal is dubious because "unions have no
constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-employees" '2 9' in the
first place. No authority supports the claim that the First Amendment is
implicated to protect unions "whenever governments place limitations on a
union's entitlement to agency fees above and beyond what Abood and
283. Id.
284. Id. at 2378-2380.
285. Id. at 2378 (emphasis added).
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 2379.
289. Id. at 2378-2379.
290. Id. at 2379 (citing Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 306 n.16
(1986) (quoting Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774 (1961))).
291. Id.
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Hudson require. ' 92 Equally plain, the Hudson procedures simply outline
"a minimum set of procedures by which a [public sector] union in an
agency-shop relationship could meet its requirement under Abood."'2 93
Although § 760 requires more than the constitutional (Hudson) minimum,
this move cannot trigger First Amendment scrutiny because the
constitutional floor for unions' collection and spending of agency fees is
not a constitutional ceiling for state-imposed restrictions.294 The Supreme
Court's rejection of the allegation that dissent should not be presumed
appears to fortify the First Amendment rights of an increasingly diverse
workforce by setting the stage for objectors to contest all activities engaged
in by labor unions.
Thirdly, the Court found that the enactment of § 760 was permissible
under the Court's campaign-finance jurisprudence.2 95 Despite this, the
respondent contended that the rigorous First Amendment scrutiny required
by precedent mandated that "§ 760 is unconstitutional because it [limits
how the union can spend its money] and because it does not limit
equivalent election-related expenditures by corporations. 296 The Court,
however, disagreed:
For purposes of the First Amendment, it is entirely immaterial
that § 760 restricts a union's use of funds only after those funds
are already within the union's lawful possession under
Washington law. What matters is that public-sector agency fees
are in the union's possession only because Washington ... [has]
compelled their employees to pay those fees.297
The WEA wrongly relied upon cases that dealt with governmental
restrictions on how a regulated entity might spend money that had come
into its possession without government coercion of its employees. 298 As
applied to public-sector unions, § 760 cannot be described as a restriction
on how the union spends its money; instead, "it is a condition placed upon
the union's extraordinary state entitlement to acquire and spend other
people's money ' 299 and the voters are entitled to have a different opinion
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 2383 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 2380.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
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about non-coercively acquired corporate funds.300 The Court dismissed the
union's expressive/associational rights contentions as well.30'
The fourth question-whether the voters of Washington acted to
impermissibly distort the marketplace of ideas when they placed a
reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on the State's general
authorization allowing public-sector unions to acquire and spend the money
of government employees--can be answered rather easily if one agrees
with the Washington State Supreme Court. The court recognized that the
voters acted to maintain the integrity of the election process.30 2 Since the
voters acted to protect the election process, and since the speech, at issue, is
entirely proscribable, "content-based regulation is permissible so long as
'there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is
afoot."'30 3 The same answer is obtained "when, as here, an extraordinary
and totally repealable authorization to coerce payment from government
employees is at issue."3°4 Justice Scalia did not find any suppression of
ideas afoot because "the union remains as free as any other entity to
participate in the electoral process with all available funds other than the
state-coerced agency fees lacking affirmative permission.
30 5  Since the
state has the constitutional power to deprive labor unions of the authority to
coerce entirely, that authority persists when the state imposes a less
comprehensive limitation on unions' power.
In answering the fifth question-whether § 760 unconstitutionally
draws distinctions based on the content of the union's speech-Justice
Scalia reviewed the landscape. He acknowledged that content-based
regulations of speech were presumptively invalid because content-based
discrimination raised the specter that the government was attempting to
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.30
6 Here, however,
the Court declared that it is impossible to "believe that the voters of
Washington impermissibly distorted the marketplace of ideas when they
placed a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral limitation on the State's general
authorization allowing public-sector unions to acquire and spend the money
of government employees., 30 7 In truth, one might argue that the opposite is
true. By depriving the marketplace of all compulsorily-obtained funds the
Supreme Court, consistent with its precedents in Abood and Hudson,
300. Id.
301. See id. at n.2. (stating that the Washington court's invocation of the union's
expressive associational rights, as a basis for invalidating § 760, was largely abandoned by
the WEA before the U.S. Supreme Court).
302. Id. at 2381.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 2381-2382.
305. Id. at 2382.
306. Id. at 2380-2381.
307. Id. at 2381.
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signals that "whatever the amount[at issue], the quality of [union
dissenters'] interest in not being compelled to subsidize the propagation of
political or ideological views that they oppose is clear., 30 8 The Supreme
Court's alarm vindicates Thomas Jefferson and James Madison's interest in
precluding tyranny that is facilitated by the forced extraction of any amount
"for the 'propagation of opinions [any citizen] disbelieves.' 39  Because
the Washington voters sought to protect the integrity of the election
process, which they believed was being impaired by the infusion of
nonmembers' money, the restriction on the state-bestowed entitlement was
permissibly limited to the state-created harm that the voters sought to
remedy.31 °
The Supreme Court majority recognized that the rights of
nonmembers might not necessarily warrant judicial interference with a
union's statutory entitlement.31' Judicial reluctance, taking the form of a
refusal to hinder a union's entitlement by stoutly sustaining dissenters'
freedom of expression rights, may create a void as well as a basis for
mischief. This lacuna in earlier cases has led to difficulty in exercising
freedom of expression rights.312 Nonetheless, the entire Court concluded
that judicial hesitation "does not imply that legislatures (or voters)
themselves cannot limit the scope of that entitlement. 3 13 The WEA could
not convincingly claim its First Amendment rights trumped the
constitutional rights of nonmembers to prevent the union from spending
their dues on nongermane activities when the state, through its legislature
or its voters, so limited the union's entitlement to agency fees. The
Supreme Court dismissed the union's First Amendment counter-claims and
insisted that dissenting workers' First Amendment rights retain their
vitality.
Lastly, the Court limited its holding to public-sector cases despite the
fact that § "760 applies on its face to both public- and private-sector unions
in Washington."'31 4  "Since private-sector unions collect agency fees
through contractually required action taken by private employers rather
308. Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986). (emphasis added).
309. Id.
310. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2381.
311. Id. at 2379-80.
312. See, e.g., Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1327 ("The Beck
Court's ... approach failed to supply a clear enforcement mechanism or clear principles.
Consequently, this has led to problems in exercising Beck rights."); see also United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(enforcing an NLRB order requiring dues objectors to pay for union organizing expenditures
that are arguably non-germane despite the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Ellis v. Bhd. of
Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984) which disallowed such expenditures).
313. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2379-80.
314. Id. at2382.
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than by government agencies, Washington's regulation of such private
arrangements presents a somewhat different constitutional question."
3 15
Refusing to answer this question, Justice Scalia's opinion upheld § 760
only as applied to public-sector unions. 1 6 Though he insisted that private-
sector restrictions present a different question than public-sector ones, that
contention raises a more salient reply inquiry: Does an effort to find a
difference between private-as opposed to public-sector labor union
compulsion constitute an elusive search for an illusion?
While the Davenport Court insists that the rights of workers can be
protected by state restrictions on labor union power, and while Washington
State's limitation "actually advance[d] First Amendment values by
safeguarding the interest of nonmembers in not having to pay for union
political activities with which they disagree," '317 Justice Scalia's failure to
answer the last question posed by Davenport's facts suggests union
dissenters should embrace referenda and legislation cautiously for at least
two reasons. First, such referenda and legislation must be interpreted by
the courts. However insistent the Supreme Court may be regarding union
dissenters' free speech rights, reluctant adjudication persistently places
First Amendment values in harm's way. Second, given the Court's
constrained conception of government coercion, prior deficiencies in its
free rider jurisprudence, its current failure to breathe life into the facts and
implications of Beck and Lehnert cases, and the virtually unlimited basis
for disagreement among citizens, it seems obvious that dissenting workers
in the state of Washington and elsewhere should refrain from celebrating
what may be a negligible victory.
V. CAN DAVENPORT RECLAIM FIRST AMENDMENT VALUES?
On a number of levels, the Davenport opinion reflects an enduring
conflict regarding the nature of liberalism and liberal values, including the
First Amendment. Christopher Shannon intimates that classical liberals
viewed rationality as existing within the individual, whereas contemporary
liberals, and by extension the union hierarchs within their ranks, appear to
318
see rationality in large institutions. In contrast to contemporary
liberalism of the compulsory variety, it might be argued in Lockean terms
that a worker as a "true agent" is an individual who, "according to his own
light and the sense of right and wrong, causes his own actions, without
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 9, Davenport
v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372 (2006) (Nos. 05-1589 and 05-1657).
318. SHANNON, supra note 152, at 147.
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undue external influence."3 9 Freedom on one account allows one to "go
beyond individual and collective selfishness and reach out to that which
reason perceives as objectively good and true. 3 20 "The agent is, of course,
determined to act the way he does, for otherwise his action would be
arbitrary. But the source of the determination of his will is ultimately
internal to him and subject to rational scrutiny"32' and lies beyond
involuntary conformity. It is not clear that Lockean views can be relied
upon in a world where philosophical liberalism may be an impossibility3 22
and political liberalism may be nothing more than an "unprincipled modus
vivendi... devoid of deep conviction." '323 Nonetheless, viewpoint diversity
internalized in workers and grounded in deep conviction that gives space
for individuals to enjoy the right to do what they ought32 4 appears to operate
consistently with First Amendment values and weakens prevailing
conceptions of labor union solidarity that require workers to act, if not
think, uniformly.
Postmodemism may help society discover three possibilities. First,
postmodernism may help reclaim the search for life-purpose as well as the
formerly invisible (traditional) sources of diversity and places the notion of
group interest and preference uniformity in the crosshairs by showing that
the sources and the depth of conflict are increasing. The persistence of
postmodernism, the likelihood of group capture, and the search for life-
purpose (within or outside of classical liberalism) coalesce to formulate
conditions that impair the prospect of finding a present-day basis for
worker interest and preference uniformity.
Second, postmodemism illuminates the difficulties that labor unions
face today. Such difficulties may drive unions toward coercion. Labor
unions, battered by the vagaries of modern and post-Enlightenment history
including declining union density rates, burdened by the irreparable
disintegration of solidarity and brooding heavily on the unlikely possibility
of recapturing their former ascendancy have succumbed, as public choice
theory predicts, to the incentive to pursue hegemony through politics
funded by compulsory contributions.
319. ANDRZEIJ RAPACZYNSKI, NATURE AND POLITICS: LIBERALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES
OF HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU 176 (1987) (discussing Locke).
320. Avery Cardinal Dulles, Truth as the Ground of Freedom: A Theme of John Paul H,
in RECOVERING SELF-EVIDENT TRUTHS: CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN LAW 69, 72
(Michael A. Scaperlanda & Teresa Stanton Collett eds., 2007).
321. RAPACZYNSKI, Supra note 319, at 176.
322. Larry Alexander, Illiberalism All the Way Down: Illiberal Groups and Two
Conceptions of Liberalism, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 625, 625 (2002).
323. Id.; see also Eric R. Claeys, John Locke's General Theory of Free Association
(forthcoming) (on file with author).
324. Dulles, supra note 320, at 73 (quoting Lord Acton).
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Third, if postmodern discourse is adopted by courts, commentators
and even union hierarchs, this may make it more difficult to reconstruct a
principled ground for protecting liberty of conscience, association, and
expression. Postmodern discourse may deprive us of the language
necessary to reclaim rights and freedom within any contestable context.
This possibility may return us to Alasdair MacIntyre's dilemma, wherein
human history provides no sound basis for rights. MacIntyre points out
that rights attaching to human beings simply qua human beings found no
expression in any ancient or medieval language until the close of the
middle ages.325 Equally clear, the adjudication of rights attaching to union
dues dissenters qua dissenters may be submerged in imaginative
adjudication that is grounded in the Supreme Court's deference to its own
version of modern liberalism: cosmopolitan explication. This may leave
dissenters without sufficient language to challenge adjudication, which
worryingly, may leave authoritarianism and compulsion in place.
Given the level of political spending that typically plagues public-
sector unions32 6 and the diversity of views available within the workforce, it
may be difficult to take seriously the Supreme Court resolution of a dispute
involving less than one-fourth of one percent of the WEA's total
expenditures. 32 7 This is particularly so, since the year after the law went in
to effect,3 28 the WEA "actually increased the amount it spent to influence
politics by 60 percent."3 29 Though grounds for skepticism may engulf the
capacity of the Davenport case to empower dues objectors to reclaim First
Amendment values, grounds for optimism can be found in the Court
resolution of two issues: (A) that the state of Washington could
constitutionally eliminate agency fees entirely in order to protect workers'
rights to their own money and (B) that the citizens of Washington are not
bound by the allegation that dissent within labor unions cannot be
presumed.
First, although the Court rightly concluded that Washington's citizens
could eliminate agency fees affecting public-sector workers and private-
sector workers covered by the NLRA, it is not necessarily true that the
citizens have the right to preclude similar agency/nonmember fee
arrangements involving dues objectors arising under the RLA. In Hanson,
the Supreme Court noted that the 1951 amendment to the RLA permitted
the negotiation of union shop agreements, and expressly allowed those
325. EDMUNDSON, supra note 153, at 4-5 (discussing Maclntyre).
326. See supra Part I.B (discussing Leo Troy's information).
327. See Mix, supra note 20 (noting that one party who filed an amicus brief pointed out
that the funds covered by the statute amounted to less than one-fourth of one percent of the
WEA's total expenditures).
328. Id.
329. Id.
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agreements notwithstanding any law "of any State."'33 It appears that the
citizens of Washington do not have unlimited authority, through either
paycheck protection or right-to-work legislation, to protect the rights of all
workers to their own money.
Turning to the second issue, wherein the Court disputes the credulous
contention that dissent is not to be presumed, labor unions, relying on this
presumption, have attempted to shield their ability to forcibly extract funds
from scrutiny premised on the thin claim that all workers receive the
benefits of their advocacy. The Supreme Court's rejection of this claim
constitutes an attractive vehicle for restoring honesty to the union dues
debate. Appeal is enhanced because the Court affirmatively stated that
"unions have no constitutional entitlement to the fees of nonmember-
employees."3 3' This declaration is consistent with the notion that conflict
not agreement is the norm in our society. In a post-Enlightenment world
that has recaptured the search for life-purpose as well as the formerly
invisible sources of diversity, it seems impossible not to presume dissent.
No longer captive to the myth of "universal" workers presumably bound
together in a common struggle against management, courts have the
opportunity to vitiate free-rider presuppositions and confront the fact that
self-interest drives union leaders and their ideological allies just as much as
it drives represented workers. This enables courts to see conflict, not
agreement, as the background from which union dues disputes surface.
Illuminated by the presence of dissent, the Court and the courts have a
basis to revisit free riding presumptions and reconsider union claims that a
contested policy will ultimately inure to the benefit of disapproving
workers.
Despite these two grounds for optimism, it is possible to see the
Davenport case as a continuation of highly flexible First Amendment
adjudication that undermines First Amendment values. Three reasons
present themselves. First, although § 760 applies on its face to both public-
and private-sector unions, the Davenport Court could not find a basis to
validate the § 760 with respect to private-sector workers. This is troubling
because it is difficult to separate public- from private-sector labor unions.332
Prior Court decisions rested on the absence of state action, the difficulty of
finding governmental coercion,333 the presence of a duty of fair
330. Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
331. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2379 (2007).
332. See infra p. 712(discussing difficulties in drawing lines between public- and
private-sector unions).
333. Commc'n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 761 (citing Hanson, 351 U.S.
225 for the proposition that it is possible to find government coercion where the RLA
preempts all state law banning union security agreements).
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representation, 334 or on the claim that the Court need not answer the
question. 35 If a state fails to outlaw private-sector union-shops and union
security agreements sanctioned by the NLRA, it appears that just as much
governmental coercion is present as the Court has found in cases arising
under public-sector bargaining statutes. Private-sector employers and labor
unions operating under the aegis of the NLRA or the RLA were ceded
authority by the Federal government to coerce private sector dues payments
from dissenting employees, enforceable through the right to terminate
workers for nonpayment of dues.336 The Court's failure to affirmatively
state that Washington State's paycheck protection referenda ought to apply
to private-sector unions appears to avoid some, but not all of the force of
Justice Scalia's Lehnert opinion with respect to public-sector disputes. As
previously indicated, he would vindicate First Amendment freedoms by
precluding unions from charging objectors for any expense that did not
relate to an activity expressly authorized by statute, irrespective of its
impact or lack thereof, on free expression.3 7 Embracing and extending the
logical force of Justice Scalia's Lehnert proposal to constitutionally
invalidate all such activities in both the private- and public-sector might be
a positive step in reestablishing the rights of all workers to be free from
ideological conformity in a nation in which it is difficult to draw lines
between public- and private-sector unions.
Second, the Davenport opinion affirms the Supreme Court's
problematic approach to free-riding. Free-riding constitutes the primary
justification for agency-fee arrangements.
33 8 It would be constructive for
the Court to explain how the union activity at issue benefits nonmembers
before valorizing agency-fee arrangement on free-riding grounds. It would
also be constructive for the Courts to place a heavy burden of proof on
unions and require them to show beyond a reasonable doubt
3 39 that
represented workers receive a direct and tangible economic benefit before
334. Beck, 487 U.S. at 738 (stating it must decide whether the duty of fair representation
applies).
335. See, e.g., Beck, 487 U.S. at 761 (citing Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102,
121 n.16 (1982)) (implying that neither state action nor government coercion can be found
under the NLRA, but ultimately stating it need not decide that issue).
336. GORMAN AND FINKIN, supra note 5, at 907 (noting an employee's job under a union
shop provision can be terminated for failure to satisfy his or her "financial core"
obligations).
337. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 500 U.S. 507, 526 (1991).
338. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n., 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2377 (2007).
339. This approach would go beyond the Supreme Court's statement in Allen that unions
simply bear the burden of proving the proportion of union revenues devoted to political and
ideological speech. See Bhd. of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963) ("Since the
unions possess the facts and records from which the proportion of political to total union
expenditures can reasonably be calculated, basic considerations of fairness compel that they,
not the individual employees, bear the burden of proving such proportion.").
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the Court and the courts permit free-rider analysis to provide cover for
challenged expenditures. This is not to say unions fail to provide any
benefits to represented workers but to suggest that the Court has been
unprepared to fully explore these issues. As previously established, the
lower courts in Lehnert and Beck had engaged in a detailed analysis of
union expenditures. They found that most union activities did not provide
collective-bargaining benefits. Without self-interested benefits, free-rider
presumptions collapse. This result is reinforced when courts, conversant
with the implication of postmodernism, informed by workers' search for
life-purpose and knowledgeable of the formerly invisible sources of
diversity, accept the impossibility of preference and interest uniformity.
Without uniformity, the Court and the courts' attitude toward free-riding
surfaces as an anachronism.
Third, the Supreme Court continues to discount the rights of dues
objectors by insisting on the validity of the Hudson rule. The Court stated,
"Neither Hudson nor any of our other cases ...has held that the First
Amendment mandates that a public-sector union obtain affirmative consent
before spending a nonmember's agency fees for purposes not chargeable
under Abood.'3 40 The Davenport Court's affirmation of the validity of this
approach seems irreconcilable with a principled and energetic approach to
freedom of speech. The Davenport Court's free-rider and First
Amendment analysis taken together imply that compulsory dues payments
for political, ideological and other non-germane purposes impermissibly
impinge on the constitutional rights of dissenting workers. It follows,
therefore, that consent ought to be required before the burden of
ideological, political and other non-germane expenditures can be imposed
on dissenters. Instead, the Court commands something less than consent. 34'
Furthermore, it can be argued that political and ideological expenses
that have an ostensibly germane purpose ought to implicate First
Amendment values no matter how germane the purpose is alleged to be.
Taken together, the Court's failure to require prior consent, to understand
that freedom of speech issues are at stake even when challenged
expenditures are alleged to have a germane purpose, and to address
workers' freedom of association interest give rise to a truncated calculus
that appears to dispute Madison's view requiring consent before the
ideological burdens of membership can attach. The Hudson rule-
requiring dissenters to object as opposed to requiring unions to first obtain
consent-ought to be contestable for several reasons. Given information
340. Davenport, 127 S. Ct. at 2377.
341. Id. (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-36 (1977) for the
proposition that public-sector unions are only prohibited from using the fees of objecting
nonmembers for ideological purposes that are not germane to the union's collective-
bargaining duties).
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disparities and transaction cost imbalances that favor unions rather than
individual dissenters, the rule requiring an affirmative objection by
nonmembers in order to escape the burden of disallowable expenditures
seems harsh-particularly since the Court has admitted such expenditure
(as we have already seen) cannot be justified under its own free-rider
premises.3 42 This approach appears astonishing given the Court's apparent
acceptance of two lower courts' analyses that demonstrated the following:
(A) in Beck, the court found that nearly eighty percent of union dues were
not chargeable and (B) in Lehnert, the court found that the union spent
nearly ninety percent of its dues revenue on non-representational activity.343
Confirmatory evidence seems to be widely available.3" While the Supreme
Court is not required to draw factual inference from prior cases or
congressional testimony, it is possible for perceptive observers to question
the Court's insistence that dissenters dispute expenditure figures that ought
to be promptly available to honest union officials.
It is possible, of course, that dissenters have a disguised preference for
union political and ideological advocacy and have simply engaged in an
attempt to escape financial contributions. But in the absence of such
disguised preferences, it is axiomatic that the free-rider justification for
union political and ideological expenditures collapses.3 45 Taken together,
this analysis clarified by John Nowak and Ronald Rotunda's observations,
implicates the following question: May a union, consistent with workers'
rights of freedom of association and speech, use union dues to advance
causes or interests not favored by all of the dues payers?3 46 The Supreme
Court gives a negative answer to this question.347 Hence, it is difficult to
justify the Hudson rule mandating that dissenters acquire sufficient
342. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 141, at 1299 n.44. See also, Abood, 431 U.S. at
225-26 (holding that the state may require a public worker to pay dues or a service fee equal
to dues "insofar as the [money] ... is used to finance expenditures by the Union for the
purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment" but
not for purposes of expressing political views).
343. HUNTER, KERSEY & MILLER, supra note 2, at 4-15 (basing that figure on a detailed
examination of union financial records the lower courts found evidence supporting the
contention that non-germane expenditures were substantially higher than collective-
bargaining related expenditures).
344. See Edith Hakola & Rex Reed, Labor Plays Politics with Its Members' Dues,
WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1996, at C4 (noting unions tend to consume up to 80% of union dues
on what can be seen as indirect political, ideological and other challengeable expenditures
that seem unlikely to have a representational purpose) (cited in CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note
31, at 237); see also Compelled Political Speech: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules &
Admin., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Leo Troy, Professor of Economics, Rutgers
University), available at http://rules.senate.gov/hearings/2000/041200troy.htm.
345. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1374.
346. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 141, at 1299-1300.
347. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-26 (precluding a public sector union from charging
dissenters in order to fund the expression of the union's political views).
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information and then act to prevent the extraction of dues for disallowable
purposes when a simple rule requiring meaningful consent before
extraction could resolve the problem. A rule that mandates prior consent
by objectors, coupled with accounting safeguards that protect vulnerable
workers who have limited access to information about union accounts and
union efforts to conceal information,348 would maximize First Amendment
protection for dues objectors.
The failure to mandate consent, the calcification of free-riding
jurisprudence, and the Court's inadequate understanding of coercion is
bolstered by the prospect that unions and the labor movement itself have
been captured by hierarchs and their ideological allies, leaving workers
little scope to object. Consistent with that probability, "union elections
provide members with little real control over leaders" and unions are
"inherently undemocratic."3 49 "The law has failed to require, let alone
enforce, democratic collective-bargaining [and] has left union members
subject to manipulation of union leaders ... with interests sharply different
from theirs."35  Unrestrained by rank and file members and driven by
political ambition, union leaders have shifted labor organizations beyond
the parameters of collective-bargaining. Union hierarchs maintain that "the
only way to start winning [political] elections .. . [is] to organize."35'
Despite the Supreme Court's free rider analysis that disallows organizing
expenses, labor unions have found relief in the Ninth Circuit's analysis
justifying these same expenditures on the grounds of the purported need to
strengthen unions. If union leaders are credible about their ideological
aspirations, exceptional acuity is not required to understand that all
contested expenditures (including organizing) are an extension of their
politics despite the Supreme Court's rejection of a similar contention in
Abood.352  Given this calculus favoring hierarchy, it is doubtful that
minority interest (political or economic) will be placed at the top of the
union's agenda.353 On the contrary, union leaders are likely to fund social
and ideological positions as well as political candidates that share their own
preferences.354 Since labor unions occupy seven of the top ten spots on a
348. See e.g., Seidemann v. Bowen, 499 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2007) (reversing summary
judgment and directing the district court to consider whether the union improperly
concealed and mischaracterized ideological and political expenditures).
349. Schwab, supra note 105, at 369, 370.
350. Id. at 371.
351. Jill Lawrence, Democrats Ponder Labor Split's Political Effect, USA TODAY, July
27, 2005, at 4A.
352. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 226 (discussing dues objectors who claimed that public-
sector collective-bargaining is inherently political).
353. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1393.
354. Id.
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recent list of America's leading contributors to political parties,3 55 they
evidently have the ability to do so. This conclusion gains greater force
because public and private sector unions and their respective revenues
cannot be clearly divided since they are often both affiliate members of,
and contribute to, the same national labor organization and share the same
mission.356 Separating public sector from private sector bargaining units is
also difficult because approximately one-half of a typical union's financial
activity occurs at the national level.357 As labor's "fortunes have faded in
the marketplace, unions have directed their attention to political solutions.
The growing influence of public sector unions, with their disdain for
markets and natural reliance on political action, has fueled the shift. 35 8 It
is likely that only credulous observers suppose that unions devote their vast
resources solely to promote political issues crucial to working people.359
No longer focused on the narrow economic interest of workers, freed
from control by the membership, captivated by the preferences of society's
elites, and emancipated from the necessity of sharing in workers' economic
360 hv
pain, unions have been liberated to achieve other objectives. An
inspection of the evidence provided by Professor Troy, a careful survey of
labor union websites, a detailed inspection of available union accounts,36'
and an examination of the pronouncements of John Sweeney, Dennis
Rivera and other labor leaders, reveals that the union movement has
transformed itself into an anti-market fighting force for social justice.
Facing a persistent decline in overall union membership, animated by the
possibilities associated with special-interest politics and enthralled by an
anti-market ideology, unions seem to have engaged in an effort to enforce
the enlistment of all workers into a fighting force. This approach appears
to foster the instrumentalization of every aspect of a worker's life in the
355. Lawrence, supra note 351, at 4A.
356. See e.g., AFL-CIO/NEA Labor Solidarity Partnership,
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/jointheaflcio/nea.cfm (last visited Aug. 4, 2007); Unions of
the AFL-CIO, http://www.afl-cio.org/aboutus/unions (last visited Aug. 4, 2007) (providing a
list of more than 50 public- and private-sector affiliate unions); see also CHAVEZ & GRAY,
supra note 31, at 15-17; Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1315.
357. Marick F. Masters and Robert S. Atkin, Financial and Political Resources of Nine
Major Public Sector Unions in the 1980s, 17 J. OF LAB. REs. 183, 186 (1996).
358. Hurd, supra note 24, at 305-06 (discussing Leo Troy's view). See also, CHAVEZ &
GRAY, supra note 31, at 17-21 (cataloguing labor's move to the left).
359. CHAVEZ & GRAY, supra note 31, at 18 (demonstrating "that union bosses have put
their billions of dollars in compulsory dues behind" a number of proposals unrelated to the
economic interests of workers).
360. See, e.g., Wilkinson & French, supra note 96 (arguing that during the toughest
economic times for organized labor in decades, union leaders are more likely to keep their
jobs and get raises than the members they claim to serve. This contributes to a widening
pay gap between union members and leaders).
361. See generally, CHAVEZ& GRAY, supra note 31, at 23-52.
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service of society, 62 and thus moves the country toward transformation. 63
This maneuver indicates that unions, at last, "have succumbed to what
Jacques Ellul, the eccentric French Reformed thinker, prophesied in the
1960s-the politicization of all aspects of life. '364  This perspective
breathes life into dues objectors' contention that public-sector bargaining
itself is inherently political.3 65 Although this claim was rejected by the
Supreme Court, objective observers may have a basis for extending this
allegation to bargaining efforts in all sectors.
Union dues thus come into view as a prolepsis-the present
anticipation--of enforced ideological conformity. Labor union dues are
part of an ongoing struggle between incompatible views and
incommensurable values. Empirical data confirms that unions, as
participants in this struggle, face the risk of a loss of workplace influence.
In the long-run, political power is sure to follow. Evidently, the rules of
judicial construction do not prevent courts from taking note of such
depressing facts. If courts believe that the nation requires healthy unions,
and that strengthening the labor movement secures both the nation and the
economy, there is little reason to believe that the aspirations of America's
diverse workforce can vitiate the courts' conclusions. Strengthening labor
unions, so the argument goes, redounds to the benefit of all workers
including workers who are not yet represented by a labor union. This move
may allow all challenged expenditures to be linked to the objective of
strengthening labor unions and expanding membership as part of a potent
force for transformative unionism.366 If this objective serves as a valid
goal, doubtlessly courts are capable of discovering this "necessity." It is
impossible to believe that courts, unconstrained by an energetic conception
of freedom of speech, conscience, and association, will snub the labor
movement's ambition to convert "necessity" into a representational, and
therefore chargeable, activity. The logic of necessity, in the competent
hands of courts, could extend to plainly political and ideological activities.
This occurrence is particularly plausible because the Supreme Court has
held, in Hanson, that mandating "financial support of the collective-
bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work... does not
violate the First [Amendment]. 367  Political and ideological activities
appear to fit within the Court's rather expansive framework.
362. Harry G. Hutchison, What Workers Want or What Labor Experts Want Them to
Want? 26 QLR (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter, Hutchison, What Workers Want]
(manuscript on file with author).
363. Hutchison, What Workers Want, supra note 362.
364. Charles Colson, Promises, Promises: How to Really Build a 'Great Society',
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Aug. 2007, at 64.
365. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 226 (1977).
366. Hutchison, A Clearing in the Forest, supra note 3, at 1370.
367. Ry. Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
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The Davenport Court complements Hanson's language by
subordinating dues objections to the following proposition: Public-sector
unions are only prohibited from using the fees of objecting nonmembers for
ideological purposes that are not germane to the union's collective-
bargaining duties. 368 The Court evidently failed to preclude what union
hierarchs appear to find desirable: the metamorphosis of the ideological
into the economic. In a post-enlightenment world, it is probable that
language can be found that instantiates self-interested economic benefits
within an ideological and political framework even though workers are
bound to disagree with such claims. Less than skeptical free-rider analysis
combined with a highly contingent interpretation of the First Amendment
and bolstered by the failure to require consent, permits the conversion of
formerly nongermane activities into germane and, therefore, chargeable
ones.
Dues objectors have often alleged that sums extracted under agency-
fee agreements "have been and are and will be regularly and continually
used by the ... unions to carry on finance and pay for political activities
directly at cross-purposes with the free will and choice" of workers.
3 6 9
Resolving this squabble has proved difficult. As a result, dues objectors
have sought freedom in paycheck protection referenda and legislation.
Such initiatives inevitably become the source of litigation. Properly
understood, the Davenport case provides little positive news to dues
objectors who wish to protect their individual sovereignty and autonomy
through referenda. Although the Supreme Court rightly enforced § 760, the
Court's corresponding reification of doubtful precedent provides latitude
for courts and unions to avoid the substantive implications of the First
Amendment. This calculus places dues objectors' freedom of association
and free speech claims at risk and situates constitutional values astride a
fragile pedestal. It is unlikely that Washington State's paycheck protection
restriction can reclaim First Amendment rights. This forecast is applicable
to similar efforts in other states. Dues objectors who wish to move beyond
negligibility and toward substantive protection of freedom of speech and
association rights are likely to discover that shelter can only be found in
right-to-work legislation that renews the vitality of individual consent and
autonomy, and which clearly and unmistakably rejects compulsory union
membership in the form of coerced financial contributions. But, even so,
given Supreme Court precedent,370 they should be wary of adjudication that
368. Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n., 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2377 (2007) (citing Abood, 431
U.S. at 235-36).
369. Bhd. of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 118 (1963).
370. See, e.g., Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232 (holding that the 1951 amendment to the RLA
permits the negotiation of union shop agreements notwithstanding any law of any state).
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has the potential to vindicate Stanley Fish's less than hopeful assessment of
the authority of First Amendment freedoms in modern liberal societies.
Taken together, these doubts intimate that in a putatively liberal
society such as ours, contemporary liberalism may be deeply paradoxical at
its core.37' As Larry Alexander shows, "the freedoms that are emblematic
of liberalism-the freedoms of expression, religion, and association-all
appear to require a governmental stance of evaluative neutrality." '3 72 Thus,
freedom of expression and freedom of religion reserved only for people
with whom the government agrees are neither freedom of expression nor
freedom of religion.373 Similarly, freedom of expression that is only
reserved for people with whom union hierarchs, empowered by
government coercion, agree is unlikely to constitute freedom of expression
or be consistent with evaluative neutrality. This paradigm raises a final
question: Can union dues objectors ever overcome the emerging tendency
of modern liberalism to suppress, not vindicate, First Amendment claims?
VI. CONCLUSION
Historically, many policy innovations reflect the judgment that social
science and bureaucratic regulation have much to offer society. One of the
policy innovations arising out of the period that began during the 1930's
was society's resort to the shibboleth that industrial peace, stability and
economic adjustment would spring forth from bureaucratic
managerialism. 37 4 This endeavor to deliver economic freedom to workers
reified bargaining statutes, but issued forth in a paradox in which workers
are required to give up a portion of their freedom to union hierarchs and
government administrative agencies in exchange for the hope of higher
wages, greater job security, and collective freedom. This approach
operates as a social scientific process in which the terms of employment as
well as the conditions under which labor unions materialize are regulated
by a hierarchy. The consequence is a legal edifice of stunning
complexity375 and doubtful efficacy.376
371. ALEXANDER, Is THERE A RIGHT OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?, supra note 55, at 148.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. See e.g., STANLEY D. HENDERSON, LABOR LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 40-43
(2005).
375. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 1036 v. NLRB, 307 F.3d 760,
763 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) ("Establish[ing] an elaborate and complicated structure that
governs labor relations in almost all of the industries within the nation's private sector.").
376. See, e.g., RICHARD VEDDER & LOWELL GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK: UNEMPLOYMENT
AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (1993) (showing how pro-labor laws
enacted during the 1930's contributed to unemployment, increasing differential between
black and white workers unemployment, and worsened the economic recovery based on the
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The odds of capture, the rise in the union politicization and the
absence of preference and interest uniformity ensure that not all workers
represented by a union will be treated equally, which leads to an internal
conflict between and among workers. Metaphorically, Harvey Mansfield
argues that in our democracy, politics are "motivated especially by the
sense that you are not being treated equally. 3 7
7 Union political decision-
making as an internal governance matter-either hierarchal or
majoritarian-provides ample opportunities to subordinate the interests and
preferences of dissenters. This move conduces to an increasing sense of
grievance, which core First Amendment values, energetically enforced,
might reclaim.
Despite that possibility, America's current contentious environment
implies that the nature and defensibility of mutual obligations, including
the obligation to pay union dues, have become unclear. This possibility
interacts with another: Postmodernism, even if only partially embraced,
may leave society, the legislature, and the courts without the vocabulary
that is necessary to convincingly combat such moves. If true, adjudication
of First Amendment disputes before the U.S. Supreme Court or other courts
is more likely to become a diversion rather than a device that reclaims any
rights for dissenting workers. At the same time, suppression of viewpoint
diversity will likely be explained in benign terms. Yet, however benign the
explanation may be, those singled out for disfavor by union officials and
those who are unable to find shelter in adjudication by the NLRB, the state,
or Federal courts can be forgiven for suspecting more invidious forces are
at work.378
credulous belief that high wages and high prices would eliminate the recession and bring
industrial peace).
377. Harvey Mansfield, How to Understand Politics, FIRST THINGS, Aug./Sept. 2007, at
42 (linking this move in part to postmodern identity politics).
378. My debt to Justice Scalia should be obvious. See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
733 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
